The Bill of Rights Restoration Act by Michael H. Brown We Want Our Country Back . . . And We Need Your Help Copyright 1996 About the Cover This booklet is dedicated to all those federal and state judges who have faithfully upheld the United States Constitution. We were saddened to hear that you both resigned. What loyal American has not been stirred by the photograph of United States Marines raising our National Battle Flag on the island of Iwo Jima the morning of February 23, 1945? Three of those men died in the bloody fighting on that island within days of that photograph being taken. This is the same flag that five out of nine U. S. Supreme Court judges said that American citizens can burn as "expressive conduct" within the protection of the First Amendment, though the words "expressive conduct" are found nowhere in the First Amendment nor is there the slightest inkling in any historical record that such nonsense was the intention of those who authored the First Amendment. The official citation for this case is Texas v. Johnston, 109 S.Ct. 2533 (1989). The author of this fiasco, William J. Brennan, spent World War II in the Army, rising to the rank of Colonel. His "military" service consisted of resolving labor and manpower difficulties that arose from converting American companies to wartime production. He was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Eisenhower. He was joined in this opinion by four other judges with even less military experience. Harold Blackmun, who was appointed by Richard Nixon and authored Roe v. Wade, had no military experience whatsoever. Neither did Thurgood Marshall. Anthony M. Kennedy, who cast the deciding vote to uphold Roe v. Wade in Planned Parenthood v. Casey in 1992, spent a year on active duty in the Army National Guard in 1961-1962. Antonin Scalia went to a military prep school. The four dissenters were far better qualified to make the decision. William Rehnquist served in the Army Air Corps in North Africa in World War II. Byron White served in the Navy during World War II. He was awarded a Bronze Star and discharged as a Lieutenant Commander. John Paul Stevens served in the Navy in World War II and was awarded a Bronze Star. Sandra Day O'Connor was with her husband while he served in the U. S. Army Judge Advocate General Corps for three years in the early 1950's in Frankfurt, Germany. The irony of this ridiculous decision voted on by five draft dodgers is that the same issue concerning an identical statute had been decided generations before by the same body, the United States Supreme Court, in a case titled Halter v. Nebraska, 27 S.Ct. 419 (1907). The difference between the two cases is due only to the type of people the President and the Congress have been appointing to the federal judiciary and the fact that there is no effective way to discipline such judicial gerrymandering of our Constitution at the moment. The 1907 Supreme Court justices were a better breed. The only dissenter in 1907 was Rufus W. Peckham. He had no military service whatsoever. The author of the 1907 opinion, John Marshall Harlan, served as a Colonel of the 10th Kentucky Volunteers during the Civil War. Oliver Wendell Holmes, who fought for the Union, was shot in the chest at the Battle of Balls Bluff on October 21, 1861, shot in the neck at Antietam on September 16, 1862, and was wounded by shrapnel at Fredericksburg on May 2, 1863. Another supporter of the 1907 decision was Edward Douglass White, who fought under the Confederate flag from 1861 to 1863 until he and thousands of other Confederate troops were trapped and surrendered at the siege of Fort Hudson, Louisiana. The remaining Supreme Court judges in 1907 had no military experience. What they did have experience in was Constitutional Law and common sense. Today's judges appear to have neither. As Felix Frankfurter, later a Supreme Court judge himself, once said of his student at Harvard, William J. Brennan, Jr., he felt successful as a professor when his students thought for themselves, "but Brennan is carrying it too far" (1931). It is my contention that almost all our judges, federal and state, have been "carrying it too far." It is time to enact a law to rein these people in. Table of Contents Why We Need A Bill of Rights Restoration Act . . . . . iv Bill of Rights, First Ten Amendments to the Constitution . . . vi Background and Purpose . . . . . . . . 1 First Amendment . . . . . . . . . 8 Second Amendment . . . . . . . . . 9 Third Amendment . . . . . . . . . 10 Fourth Amendment . . . . . . . . . 10 Fifth Amendment . . . . . . . . . 11 Sixth Amendment . . . . . . . . . 14 Seventh Amendment . . . . . . . . . 17 Eighth Amendment . . . . . . . . . 18 Ninth Amendment. . . . . . . . . . 19 Tenth Amendment . . . . . . . . . 20 Explanation of Proposed Statute Required . . . . . 21 The Solution . . . . . . . . . . . 21 The Bill of Rights Restoration Act (Text of Proposed Statute) . . . 22 How To Read Supreme Court and Other Legal Citations . . . 23 Why We Need This Statute . . . . . . . . 24 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . 29 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . 30 WHY WE NEED A BILL OF RIGHTS RESTORATION ACT When our ancestors enacted our Bill of Rights in 1791 they knew exactly what they meant by the words used. The judges appointed at the federal level and their counterparts at the state level have quite often found meanings in the Bill of Rights that the original authors never intended. Our United States Supreme Court judges have often indulged in this practice. Other lower courts, both federal and state, slavishly adhere to Supreme Court "precedent," no matter how erroneous, unconstitutional, or wrong-headed. This has to stop. The Bill of Rights was enacted to protect us from government and government agents. Those agents include politically appointed judges, elected by no one, whose desire to maintain the status quo more often than not exceeds their sense of duty to administer justice. The Bill of Rights Restoration Act I am proposing here needs to be enacted to protect us from government and government agents, particularly those who think they have a mandate to change the meaning and intent of those who gave us the first ten amendments of the United States Constitution, our Bill of Rights. The Constitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That which it meant when adopted, it means now. South Carolina v. United States, 26 S. Ct. 110, 111 (1905). The Constitution today means anything that any federal or state judge wants it to mean to suit the exigencies of the moment It is common knowledge that a law enacted contrary to the Constitution is void. A Constitution which means anything a judge wants it to mean can be "shaped" to uphold any law, no matter how unconstitutional that law would have been to the original authors of the Constitution. Thomas Jefferson tried to warn us. At the establishment of our constitutions, the judiciary bodies were supposed to be the most helpless and harmless members of the government. Experience, however, soon showed in what way they were to become the most dangerous; that the insufficiency of the means provided for their removal gave them a freehold and irresponsibility in office; that their decisions, seeming to concern individual suitors only, pass silent and unheeded by the public at large; that these decisions, nevertheless, become law by precedent, sapping, by little and little, the foundations of the constitution, and working its change by construction, before anyone has perceived that that invisible and helpless worm has been busily employed in consuming its substance. In truth, man is not made to be trusted for life, if secured against all liability to account. Thomas Jefferson, letter to Monsieur A. Coray, October 31, 1823. The judiciary of the United States is the subtle corps of sappers and miners constantly working under ground to undermine the foundations of our confederated fabric. . . A judiciary independent of a king or executive alone, is a good thing; but independence of the will of the nation is a solecism,1 at least in a republican government. Thomas Jefferson, letter to Thomas Ritchie, December 25, 1820. It's now up to us to reverse it. Mike Brown P. O. Box 4884 Springfield, Mo 65808 The Bill of Rights ARTICLE I. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. ARTICLE II. A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. ARTICLE III. No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. ARTICLE IV. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. ARTICLE V. No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. ARTICLE VI. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. ARTICLE VII. In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. ARTICLE VIII. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. ARTICLE IX. The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. ARTICLE X. The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. Background And Purpose Remove not the ancient landmark, which thy fathers have set. Proverbs 22:28. The preservation of a free government requires not merely, that the metes and bounds which separate each department of power be invariably maintained; but more especially, that neither of them be suffered to overleap the great Barrier which defends the rights of the people. The Rulers who are guilty of such an encroachment, exceed the commission from which they derive their authority, and are Tyrants. The People who submit to it are governed by laws made neither by themselves, nor by an authority derived from them, and are slaves. Because it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first duty of Citizens, and one of the noblest characteristics of the late Revolution. The free men of America did not wait till usurped power had strengthened itself by exercise, and entangled the questions in precedents.1 They saw all the consequences in the principle, and they avoided the consequences by denying the principle. James Madison in "A Memorial and Remonstrance" on June 20, 1785, 8 Papers of James Madison 299-300 (University of Chicago Press Edition 1973) Our Constitution was extensively amended. Amendments 13, 14, and 15 were added after our Civil War. That conflict, costing us 600,000 men, was in large part precipitated by an unwise United States Supreme Court decision, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1856). Dred Scott held that "slaves were property" and had to be returned to their masters contrary to the law in the Bible.2 Our Constitution was amended pursuant to Article V based on that experience. The United States was originally formed as a Constitutional Republic. What we have is no longer a Constitutional Republic. What we have is a Judicial Dictatorship. Look around you. Who gave us forced bussing? Judges. Who took Bible reading out of public schools? Judges. Who gave us abortion-on-demand? Judges. Who changed the meaning of the word "militia" in the Second Amendment in order to uphold unconstitutional federal gun laws? Judges. No federal or state legislature is responsible for any of the foregoing "laws." Our elected representatives no longer make laws: they make suggestions. Our actual law is made by judges, elected by no one. We can take our Constitutional Republic back. We can "do it" with the enactment of a single statute, proposed later in this publication. After the proposed statute is a brief explanation of how to read case citations such as Roe v.. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973) and what we need you to do to help get our country back. However, before you can take action, you have to understand how we got in this mess: After many years of public service at the national capital, and after a somewhat close observation of the conduct of public affairs, I am impelled to say that there is abroad in our land a most harmful tendency to bring about the amending of constitutions and legislative enactments by means alone of judicial construction. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 31 S. Ct. 502, 533 (1910) (Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judicial construction is not the way our Constitution is supposed to be amended: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which in either Case, shall be valid upon all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the First Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate. Article V, U. S. Constitution If in the opinion of the People, the distribution or modification of the Constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the Constitution designates. But let there be no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. President George Washington Farewell address, September 19, 1796. Today the idea that Supreme Court judges, other federal judges, and state judges can "change the meaning" of our Constitution and of our laws by "interpretation" seems to be commonly accepted. This simply is not the way a Constitution is supposed to work. The judicial function is that of interpretation; it does not include the power of amendment under the guise of interpretation. To miss the point of difference between the two is to miss all that the phrase "supreme law of the land" stands for and to convert what was intended as inescapable and enduring mandates into mere moral reflections. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 57 S. Ct. 578, 587 (1937) (dissent). Over a hundred years ago the U. S. Supreme Court spelled out in no uncertain terms what "interpretation" of the Constitution actually means. It does not mean to change the meaning: The object of construction, applied to the constitution, is to give effect to the intent of its framers, and of the people adopting it. This intent is to be found in the instrument itself; and when the text of a constitutional provision is not ambiguous, the courts in giving instruction thereto, are not at liberty to search for its meaning beyond the instrument. To get at the thought or meaning expressed in a statute, a contract, or a constitution, the first resort, in all cases, is to the natural signification of the words, in the order of grammatical arrangement in which the framers of the instrument have placed them. If the words convey a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity, nor any contradiction of other parts of the instrument, then that meaning, apparent on the face of the instrument, must be accepted, and neither the courts nor the legislature have the right to add to it or take from it. Newell v. People, 7 N.Y. 97; Hills v. Chicago, 60 Ill. 86; Denn v. Reid, 10 Pet. 524; Leonard v. Wiseman, 31 Md. 204; People v. Potter, 47 N.Y. 375; Cooley, Const. Lim. 57; 1 Story, Const. section 400; Beardstown v. Virginia, 76 Ill. 34. So, also, where a law is expressed in plain and unambiguous terms, whether those terms are general or limited, the legislature should be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for construction. U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 399; Dogget v. Railroad Co., 99 U.S. 72. There is even stronger reason for adhering to this rule in the case of a constitution than in that of a statute, since the latter is passed by a deliberative body of small numbers, a large proportion of whose members are more or less conversant with the niceties of construction and discrimination, and fuller opportunity exists for attention and revision of such a character, while constitutions, although framed by conventions, are yet created by the votes of the entire body of electors in a state, the most of whom are little disposed, even if they were able, to engage in such refinements. The simplest and most obvious interpretation of a constitution, if in itself sensible, is the most likely to be that meant by the people in its adoption. Such considerations give weight to that line of remark of which People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 35, affords an example. There, BRONSON, J., commenting upon the danger of departing from the import and meaning of the language used to express the intent, and hunting after probable meanings not clearly embraced in that language, says: "In this way the constitution is made to mean one thing by one man, and something else by another, until in the end it is in danger of being rendered a mere dead letter; and that, too, where the language is so plain and explicit that it is impossible to mean more than one thing, unless we lose sight of the instrument itself, and roam at large in the fields of speculation." Words are the common signs that mankind make use of to declare their intention to one another; and when the words of a man express his meaning plainly, distinctly, and perfectly, we have no occasion to have recourse to any other means of interpretation. Lake County v. Rollins, 9 S. Ct. 651, 652 (1889). Occasionally one of today's judges recognizes this principle, though it is almost always in a dissent. Interpretation . . . is a process when we figure out the meaning of words that are actually there; interpreting the sounds of silence is a euphemism for rewriting. Graham v. U. S., 96 F. 3d 446, 450 (9th Cir. 1996) (dissent). A dissent is a disagreement by one or more judges with the majority decision. A dissent is not law. The constitution . . . is a mere thing of wax in the hands of the judiciary, which they may twist and shape into any form they please. Thomas Jefferson, letter to Judge Spencer Roane, September 6, 1819. The dishonesty of the judiciary does not end with changing the meaning of the Constitution to suit judicial whim. Judges who were once restricted to deciding individual cases are now allowed to set social policy. In order to set the social policies that suit the "whim of the day" those same judges often rewrite history. The potential consequences of rewriting history were described half a century ago by George Orwell in 1984. A major theme of the book is the "mutability of the past." There is no such thing as honest history anymore; what is done can always be undone. The job of the main character, Winston, at the Ministry of Truth is to rewrite old newspaper articles so that every Party prediction is vindicated. "[I]f all others accepted the lie which the Party imposed -- if all records told the same tale," Winston reflects, "then the lie passed into history and became truth." Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past. George Orwell, 1984 (1949). Judicial rewriting of history to fit judicial activist desires has long been recognized by legal scholars: On occasion, however, the Court has invoked a rather distinct historical technique, which deserve some examination here. The resort to the extended essay in constitutional history usually of what should be called the "law-office" variety. By "law-office" history, is meant the selection of data favorable to the position being advanced without regard to or concern for contradictory data or proper evaluation of the relevance of the data proffered. See Kelly, Clio3 and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair Supreme Court Review 119, 122 (1965). This type of behavior on the part of the judges, rewriting laws and history in order to arrive at a predetermined result, was recognized by other members of the legal profession even before our Declaration of Independence. [T]he office of a Judg (as Cook4 well observes) is jus dicere, not jus dare; not to make any Laws by strains of wit, or forced Interpretations; but plainly and impartially to declare the Law already establisht. The English-mans Right, Sir John Hawles, page 10 (1680). Supposedly the courts follow the doctrine of "stare decisis," to abide by decided decisions. As Justice William Rehnquist observed, "[N]o amount of repetition of historical errors can make the errors true." Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2516 (1985). [S]tare decisis may bind courts as to matter of law, but it cannot bind them as to matter of history. Id. @ 2512. Apparently Justice Rehnquist is unaware that the present day U. S. Supreme Court over which he presides as Chief Justice is in reality the Ministry of Truth described by George Orwell in 1984. Kelly in Clio and the Court bears repeating: Once ultimate truth was thus affirmed, subsequent Courts . . . were quite content to quote the Court's earlier affirmation without further historical inquiry. In a sense, by quoting history, the Court made history, since what it declared history to be was frequently more important than what the history might actually have been. Clio and the Court @ 123. Rather than allow judges to call what they do "interpretation" let's label this type of behavior in rewriting our Constitution, laws, and history for what it really is, constructive fraud: A breach of legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of the moral guilt of the fraud feasor, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others. . .Neither actual dishonesty of purpose nor intent to deceive is an essential element of constructive fraud. A plea of constructive fraud relieves plaintiffs of burden of proving scienter, or fraudulent intent. Morrison v. Back Yard Burgers, Inc., 91 F. 3d 1184, 1187-88 (8th Cir. 1996). Constructive fraud consists in any act of commission or omission contrary to legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, which is contrary to good conscience and operates to the injury of another. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, page 595. To show how far this judicial gerrymandering of our Constitution has gone, a comparison of the original intent of the Bill of Rights and examples of "judicial construction" at work follow. FIRST AMENDMENT Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Congress did in fact make a law respecting an establishment of religion, 26 U.S.C.  501 (c) (3), tax exempt status for churches and other organizations. The statute itself is quite innocuous on its face. [A] court should go beyond the literal language of a statute if reliance on that language would defeat the plain purpose of the statute. Bob Jones University v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2025 (1983). Purpose as defined by whom? Our elected representatives or the United States Supreme Court? Bob Jones University had its tax-exempt status revoked because of its "racially discriminatory admissions policy," even though such a policy may have a basis in Leviticus 19:19, Genesis 6, and the Book of Nehemiah. For more on this "muzzling" of pastors unless they preach a "politically correct" line see Sanctuary of Silence by Peter Kershaw, P. O. Box 823, Forsyth, Mo. 65653. "Prohibiting the free exercise thereof" was insured when the Supreme Court took Bible reading out of the public schools. See School District of Abington Tp., Pa., v. Schempp, 83 S. Ct. 1560 (1963). Freedom of speech was abridged in Debs v. United States, 39 S. Ct. 252 (1919), a case in which an anti-war activist tried to keep us out of World War I. Eugene Debs was convicted and sent to federal prison for ten years for urging men to avoid the draft, telling his audience that the master class declares war and the working class furnishes the corpses, and referring to a trial judge as "a corporation tool on the bench." Freedom of the press since 1963 has meant the major media can libel anyone and there isn't anything you can do about it. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964). Don't even think about a peaceable assembly outside an abortion clinic. In the 18th and 19th century "petition the Government" meant Congress would give you a hearing. Today it means you can write a letter to a Congressman, but he may never read it. SECOND AMENDMENT A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. Almost all federal and state courts held that this right is a "collective right" and does not apply to individuals. This "collective right" theory was first enunciated by the Kansas Supreme Court in 1905. Salina v. Blakesly, 72 Kansas 230; 83 Pacific Reporter 61 (1905). The theory is patently wrong. Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Michigan Law Review 204, 211, note 31 (1983). As Professor Kates, in Handgun Prohibition pointed out, the word "people" in the First and Fourth Amendments ("individuals") did not change meaning in the Second. "Militia" was defined by Congress in 1792. This is still the statute on the books today: 10 U.S.C.  311 Militia: composition and classes (a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males of at least 17 years of age and except as provided in section 313 of Title 32, under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and female citizens of the United States who are members of the National Guard. Section 313 of Title 32 merely refers to those individuals who are already members of the National Guard. The 19th century Supreme Court flatly stated that "The militia is all citizens capable of bearing arms." Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886).THIRD AMENDMENT No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. This amendment has become, in today's courts, almost superfluous. At least prior to our 1776 Revolution the owner got to keep his house. Today federal and state judges order people evicted from their homes in corrupt court proceedings on a daily basis. FOURTH AMENDMENT The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The Seventh Circuit addressed the Fourth Amendment in U. S. v. Chapman, 954 F. 2d 1352, 1367 (7th Cir. 1992): In civilian cases, the warrant requirement has been abrogated5 by judicial decision only in certainly carefully described situations. One of those "carefully described situations" is discussed in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2037 (1971). What the Supreme Court expounded on was the "plain view" doctrine: if an incriminating object is in "plain view" the police do not need a warrant describing it. In the real world an occasional promotion-hungry police officer gets a search warrant to search your house for marijuana plants, turns your house inside out until he finds a sawed-off shotgun in "plain view," and arrests you. Some police carry in the evidence with them, plant it (known in police lingo as "farming" or "flaking"), "find" it in "plain view," and arrest you for it. This is a regular experience for college students pulled over for traffic violations and then arrested for having open alcohol containers or marijuana. FIFTH AMENDMENT No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. The original reason for a grand jury investigation and grand jury secrecy was to keep government attorneys out of the criminal investigation and out of the grand jury room. Schwartz, Demythologizing the Grand Jury, 10 Amer. Cr. L. Rev. 701 (1972). A few words from an earlier source bear repeating. These words may be more relevant than you think: I know not how long the practice in that matter of admitting counsel to a grand-jury hath been; I am sure it is a very unjustifiable and unsufferable one. If the grand-jury have a doubt in point of law, they ought to have recourse to the court, and that publicly, and not privately, and not to rely upon the private opinion of counsel, especially of the king's counsel, who are, or at least behave themselves as if they were parties. Remarks on Colledge's Trial by Sir John Hawles, Solicitor-General6 in the Reign of King William the Third, 8 Howell State Trials 724 (1681). You might wonder what relevance a 1681 English Solicitor-General's remarks have upon our Bill of Rights of 1791. The English Declaration of Rights of 1689 is antecedent of our constitutional text. The original meaning and circumstances of that enactment are relevant today. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2687 (1991). Back then judges and prosecutors were as subject to the criminal law as the rest of us. Today, for the most part, they answer to no one. A grand jury is supposed to serve as both a shield and a sword. It is supposed to stand between the accused and the government, acting independently of the prosecutor or judge. Stirone v. United States, 80 S. Ct. 270, 273 (1960). How "independent" the grand jury is can be observed by looking at statistics. In 1991, for example, 785 federal grand juries were convened in the United States. Federal prosecutors asked for 25,943 indictments. In all those cases 785 federal grand juries returned sixteen (16) no bills. See Burnham, Above The Law: Secret Deals, Political Fixes And Other Misadventures Of The U. S. Department Of Justice, page 360 (Scribner 1996). I.e., whatever an unscrupulous or overzealous prosecutor wants, he gets, regardless of the guilt or innocence of his intended victim or the constitutionality of the criminal statute he is attempting to enforce. Nineteenth century federal court judges admonished grand juries to question whether Congress had the authority to pass the Act. In re Miller, Fed. Cas. No. 9,552 (C.Ct.D. Ind. 1878). As a "sword" the grand jury is equally useless in the hands of judges and prosecutors. Our ancestors could swear out criminal complaints against those violating federal law. See U. S. v. Marion, 92 S. Ct. 455, 468 (1971). Today only a federal prosecutor can swear out a federal criminal complaint. See Barnes v. Smith, 654 F. Supp. 1244, 1247 (E.D. Mo. 1987). This is not what our ancestors understood. Today putting people in jeopardy twice is commonplace. The judges get around this one with the "dual sovereigns doctrine." If someone is charged with "armed robbery" in federal court and found innocent, the State prosecutor can charge the acquitted defendant again. See Bartkus v. People of State of Illinois, 79 S. Ct. 676 (1959). Defendants in criminal cases are compelled to be witnesses against themselves all the time. These proceedings are called "guilty pleas" and were unknown to our ancestors. Supposedly, criminal defendants "waive" their right to self-incrimination in order to obtain the "benefits" of a plea bargain. In reality prosecutors "stack" charges to terrorize defendants and induce plea bargains motivated by fear of draconian sentences meted out by a judge who has already demonstrated his venality and bias in favor of the prosecution. Such proceedings are almost always upheld as "lawful" by the judges. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978). One of the clever ways judges get around the self-incrimination clause is to force a defendant to admit all the facts in his case in a "plea bargain." Those facts can then be used against him in another case. See United States v. Benson, 640 F. 2d 136 (8th Cir. 1981). Since the Supreme Court rewrote the Fifth Amendment definition of "person" in Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973), being deprived of life without "Due Process of Law" is a daily experience for the unborn in this country What the United States Supreme Court actually did in setting "social policy" in Roe v. Wade is far more insidious than most honest God-fearing citizens realize. Ancient religion did not bar abortion. Roe @ 715. An honest judge on the bench would call things by their proper name. Roe @ 721, quoting 22 Trans. of the Am. Med. Assn. 258 (1871). There has always been strong support for the view that life does not begin until live birth. This was the belief of the Stoics. Roe @ 730. What the less-than-honest Supreme Court judges in this case neglected to tell their readers was this: 1. The Stoics were followers of Zeus. 2. Zeus in the Hebrew was known as Baal. 3. Bel, supreme god of the Babylonians (see Isaiah 46). Bel is the Chaldaic form of Baal and is believed by some to be identical with that god. Like the equivalent Hebrew Baal, the name Bel was used also in the sense of "lord" or "owner." Bel presided over the air. His consort was Belit. Bel was identified with the Greek god Zeus by the Greek historian Herodotus and was believed by the British Orientalist George Rawlinson to have been different from the Syrian Baal. As Bel-Merodach the god was connected with the planet Jupiter, associated in astral mythology with the productive power of nature.7 I.e., there is a distinct possibility that the judges in Roe weren't calling what they were doing by its proper name: installing Baal worship as the official religion of the United States. And you wonder why they had to take the Bible out of the public schools first. SIXTH AMENDMENT In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. "Speedy Trial" is what you get only if the judge feels like it and your attorney demands it. A lot of defense attorneys agree to "continuances" while their client rots in jail until he "breaks" and pleads guilty. "Impartial jury" in this Amendment has to be compared to: The trial of all Crimes, except in Case of Impeachment, shall be by Jury. . . Article III Section 2 Clause 3 The obvious question is, why does "trial by jury" occur in the Constitution twice? "Trial by jury" is what we have now. It wasn't enough for our ancestors. When the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791, our ancestors added the word "impartial," meaning jury nullification, or the right of the jury not only to determine the facts but to judge the law (Was it worth enforcing? Was it unconstitutional?) as well. See Sparf v. United States, 15 S. Ct. 273, 296 (1895) (dissent).[W]here a matter of law is complicated with matter of fact, the jury have a right to determine both. Andrew Hamilton,8 quoted in The World's Best Orations, Volume 6, page 341 (1923). What judges today are careful to conceal from jury members is that judges are the chief competition to the jury. See Moore, The Jury, Tool of Kings, Palladium of Liberty, page 159 (1973). Today "impartial" means a "fair cross-section of the community." See Duren v. Missouri, 99 S. Ct. 664 (1979). The words "fair cross-section" appear nowhere in the Amendment itself. That a "fair cross-section of the community" is not what the authors of the Sixth Amendment meant can be verified in any history book: in 1791 women, blacks, Indians, and others could neither vote nor sit on juries. Today judges in all criminal cases, federal and state, tell the jurors at the end of the case before they leave the courtroom to vote, "You are here to judge the facts, you must obey the law as I give it to you." That is a lie. No constitutional provisions nor legislative enactment so states. All "jury instructions" in criminal cases are merely helpful suggestions. See U. S. v. Norton, 846 F. 2d 521, (8th Cir. 1988). Judges are always careful to conceal this fact from juries. Most jurors think this is the "law," though this was never the intent of those who wrote the Constitution nor has it ever been a statute (law) or legislative enactment of any kind. In many cases judges also see to it that evidence is concealed from juries. The Mike Tyson rape case is a prime example, in which a state judge prevented two defense witnesses from testifying that the rape "victim" (who later signed a book deal) was "all over him" before she went up to his hotel room with him. So much for "compulsory process" for obtaining witnesses in his favor. Another factor in the sixth amendment is the unanimous jury requirement, though it is not spelled out in the amendment itself. There is a reason for the unanimous jury requirement in most modern criminal trials that is studiously ignored by the legal profession today: the judgment is God's. When you raise that issue another Biblical maxim enters the equation: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. Matthew 22:39 Today's jurors, for the most part, simply view a criminal defendant as a nuisance. If American citizens would view jury duty as a religious experience instead of an unpleasant chore the reclamation of our country from a totally corrupt court system would proceed at a much faster pace. As a fourteenth century Arab scholar, Ibn Khaldun, pointed out in his book, The Muqaddimah (An Introduction To History), the only way to reverse the process of a society in decay is a religious revival. "District wherein the crime was committed" in conspiracy cases no longer exists. The leverage of a conspiracy charge lifts this limitation from the prosecution and reduces its protection to a phantom, for the crime is considered so vagrant as to have been committed in any district where any one of the conspirators did any one of the acts, however innocent, intended to accomplish its object. Krulewitch v. United States, 69 S. Ct. 716, 723 (1949). The "nature and cause of the accusation" does not exist in a conspiracy charge either. "[N]o intelligible definition of conspiracy has yet been established." Krulewitch @ 720, note 3. "Witnesses" in a criminal case today are usually government agents or other criminals who have been bribed with lighter sentences for their testimony. Notice that almost no prosecution witness is ever indicted for perjury. The first lawyers were personal friends of the litigant, brought into court by him so that he might "take 'counsel' with them" before pleading. 1 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of the English Law 211 (2d ed. 1909). Similarly, the first "attorneys" were personal agents, often lacking any professional training, who were appointed by those litigants who had secured royal permission to carry on their affairs through a representative, rather than personally. Id., at 212-213. Faretta v. California, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2534 note 16 (1975). How was the meaning of the word "counsel" changed from personal friends of the litigant to a member of a Bar Association? By judicial construction. An innocent person in today's "conviction mills" doesn't have a prayer. SEVENTH AMENDMENT In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. Libel actions were "suits at common law." "Politically connected" Jack Anderson was sued by "politically incorrect" Liberty Lobby, Inc. for libel. A few words from Justice Brennan in this case bear repeating: The Court today holds that "whether a given factual dispute requires submission to a jury must be guided by the substantive evidentiary standards that apply to the case," ante, at 2514. In my view, the Court's analysis is deeply flawed and rests on a shaky foundation of unconnected and unsupported observations, assertions, and conclusions. Moreover, I am unable to divine from the Court's opinion how these evidentiary standards are to be considered, or what a trial judge is actually supposed to do in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2515 (1986) (dissent). I.e., even a Supreme Court Justice couldn't figure out when, according to the reasoning of his colleagues, the Seventh Amendment applies. Other federal judges are equally confused. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, enacted by Congress in 1938, allows a federal judge to toss a case out of court if there is "no genuine issue of material fact." This procedure is known as "summary judgment." Rule 56 didn't do too much damage until the Supreme Court clobbered Liberty Lobby in 1986 by judicially rewriting Rule 56. Since then three out of four federal civil lawsuits have been tossed out of court on "summary judgment." See Issacharoff and Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 Yale Law Journal 73 (1990). EIGHTH AMENDMENT Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. Next time you can't make bail remember this one. Under present Supreme Court reasoning life in prison for a parking violation is perfectly acceptable. Such punishment is cruel but not unusual. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2709 (1991) (dissent). NINTH AMENDMENT The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. Probably the worst Constitutional amendment ever enacted was Amendment 17, taking away the ability of State Legislatures to choose two United States Senators to represent their state, originally Article I Section 3, and turning the selection of those individuals over to "popular vote." The consequence was that the members of the State Legislatures completely lost control of their federal representatives and abandoned the office of United States Senator to the person with the most money for campaign ads: the highest bidder. For all practical purposes, when the Seventeenth Amendment came in, we lost the Ninth Amendment. There was no longer a State Legislative mechanism to enforce the Ninth Amendment. Neither the Ninth Amendment nor the privileges or immunities clause licenses courts to engage in judicial activism by creating new rights out of whole cloth or based on some amorphous extra-constitutional standard. The Ninth Amendment is a rule of construction, emphasizing that ours is a federal government of limited powers, and that the individual rights not delegated to the government are not to be denied or disparaged simply because they are not explicitly mentioned. By definition, then, those unenumerated retained rights cannot conflict with or override the delegated powers. Wrong turns on the road to judicial activism: the Ninth Amendment and the privileges or immunities clause U. S. Department. of Justice, Office of Legal Policy (U. S. G.P.O., 1988). Now try to get a federal judge to recognize this. It won't happen. Those individuals are too busy upholding "precedent" to recognize this limitation on the federal government. At one time the United States Supreme Court itself even recognized that other courts were not bound by its decisions. Whether those decisions are followed or departed from is a question entirely within the discretion of the court. See Hertz v. Woodman, 30 S. Ct. 621, 622 (1910). Hertz went on to state that a federal circuit court of appeals isn't bound to follow its own prior decision. In constitutional law, stare decisis has no legitimate application at all. See Kilgore, Judicial Tyranny, page 36. TENTH AMENDMENT The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. Read literally, this Amendment and the Ninth Amendment, would prohibit all federal gun laws, drug laws, pro-abortion laws, and the like. Congress gets around this by the use of the Interstate Commerce Clause, Article I Section 8 Clause 3. There is nothing in the language of Article I Section 8 Clause 3 to even indicate that Congress has the authority to regulate anything after the item has moved in interstate commerce. See Professor David E. Engdahl's CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM, pages 119-20 West Publishing Company 1987. If the commerce clause were construed to reach all enterprises and transactions which could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate commerce, the federal authority would embrace practically all the activities of the people, and the authority of the state over its domestic concerns would exist only by sufferance of the federal government. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 55 S. Ct. 837, 850 (1935). We have concluded that the confusing nature of our precedents counsels a return to the underlying constitutional principle. United States v. New Mexico, 102 S. Ct. 1373, 1382 (1982). The sooner the better. Explanation of Proposed Statute Required Congress has the power to create courts of inferior jurisdiction to the United States Supreme Court. See Article III Section 1, U. S. Constitution. Section (c) of the proposed statute may seem unduly restrictive. It isn't. It is simply designed to keep an avalanche of foundationless legal opinions from cluttering the courts and keeping those who really need help from getting it. The Solution No state court or proceeding can work against you in violation of the Constitution if federal judges do not abrogate their responsibility. See 42 U.S.C.  1983, 28 U.S.C.  2254 (full text of these statutes given further on in this publication). The single federal statute needed to make our legal system work for all of us is as follows: The Bill of Rights Restoration Act a) Random alcohol and drug testing shall be mandatory for all currently active federal and state judges.9 Records of such tests shall be made easily and readily available to anyone who requests such records. b) In all cases in which it appears that a judge at the federal district court or equivalent state level has rewritten or stated the facts of the case to suit his own predilection, any person aggrieved by such action may have the true facts determined by a jury. c) In all appeals courts cases, both federal and state, in which it appears that a deciding panel of judges has altered a constitutional provision or statutory enactment through judicial construction, any person aggrieved by such action may have a jury trial to determine the applicable law, provided, however, that no such action may be commenced without the written affidavit of a law professor from an accredited law school stating that he or she has read the proposed complaint to be filed and is in agreement with the legal principles stated in the complaint. d) In all cases, the intention of those who authored the constitutional or statutory enactment shall be given greater weight than judicial precedent. e) Summary judgment at the hands of a judicial tribunal is prohibited. f) Such a decision by a jury of 12 common citizens shall apply to the case at issue only and shall have no value as precedent. g) Judges appointed to adjudicate in such cases may not come from the ranks of the present federal or state judicial system nor have had experience as a public prosecutor. HOW TO READ SUPREME COURT AND OTHER LEGAL CITATIONS The first number is the volume number. The letters between the numbers designate whether the case (at the federal level) is a Supreme Court case, Circuit Court of Appeals case (There are 13, the last two are in D.C. with no numbers), or federal district court case. The second set of numbers refers to the page on which the case begins. If there is a third set of numbers, it merely refers you to the particular page of that case to which the writer is referring. The parentheses indicate the court location and year the decision was rendered. E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 30 S. Ct. 502, 533 (1910). Supreme Court ("S. Ct.") case from 1910 is found on page 502. On page 533 you will find Justice Harlan's remarks concerning amendments of constitutions and legislative enactments by judicial construction. There are two other ways to cite Supreme Court cases, not addressed here. U. S. v. Norton, 846 F. 2d 521, (8th Cir. 1988). "F. 2d" means Federal Reporter, Second Series. These volumes contain Appeals Court decisions. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is the federal Court of Appeals for all federal district courts in Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, Nebraska, Minnesota, North and South Dakota. Barnes v. Smith, 654 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D. Mo. 1987). "F. Supp." means Federal Supplement. This is a 1987 federal district court case from the Eastern District of Missouri. 42 U.S.C.  1983 is statute number 1983 in Title 42 (Public Health and Welfare) of the United States Code. Title 28 is Judiciary and Judicial Procedure (federal). Section 453 in Title 28 is the oath of office every federal judge takes to uphold the Constitution. 10 Amer. Cr. L. Rev. 701 (1972) is a law journal citation in volume 10 of the American Criminal Law Review (page 701) published in 1972. Why We Need This Statute We have civil and criminal laws. We have state and federal laws. On the civil side we have what are called "legal issues" or "issues at law" and equitable issues. At the federal level, issues at law for money damages are decided by a jury of your fellow citizens (if you can get past the gauntlet erected by the judge). At the federal level, issues of fact or law where there is no money involved (equitable issues) are decided by a judge; or if in an appeals court case, by a panel of three (3) judges. If that judge or those judges can distort the facts of your case, rewrite history, or bend and twist the original meaning of our Constitution and statute law, to whom do you go in order to straighten up the mess they have created? Another judge? We are not as far away from having jury trials for equitable issues as you may think. We already have Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38 which allows for a jury trial in certain circumstances. Issues of fact relating to an equitable claim may be submitted to a jury . . . if the judge in his discretion chooses to do so. Dawson v. Contractors Transport Corp., 467 F. 2d 727, 730 (D.C. App. 1972). Discretion does not mean whim or caprice. An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court makes an error of law or fact. Molloy v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 94 F. 3d 808, 811 (2nd Cir. 1996). All the errors of law and fact routinely engaged in by the judiciary and unchecked by the legislature are what make our proposed statute vital to the restoration of our Constitutional Republic. We already have federal law that allows us to sue state actors (including judges) for misbehavior: 42 U.S.C.  1983--Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. We already have federal law that allows us to sue federal actors (including judges) for misbehavior: 28 U.S.C.  1331--The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. We already have federal law that allows us to declare the rights and legal relations of parties: 28 U.S.C.  2201--(a) In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes other than actions brought under section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, a proceeding under section 505 or 1146 of title 11, or in any civil action involving an antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding regarding a class or kind of merchandise of a free trade area country (as defined in section 516A (f) (10) of the Tariff Act of 1930), as determined by the administering authority, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such. (b) For limitations on actions brought with respect to drug patents see section 505 or 512 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 28 U.S.C.  2202--Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment. However, we have no way to get a corrupt, incompetent, or substance-addicted judge in front of a jury in federal court. We have more of a problem with judges "out of their minds" on alcohol and drugs than most people imagine. According to a statement made to Michael and Peggy Dadic by Assistant U. S. Attorney Terry Lindsay on October 18, 1996, in the Miami federal courthouse the number of judges with substance abuse problems amounts to more than half of all those in the United States. The United States Supreme Court has held that no judge, federal or State, can be sued for money damages if he is "in excess of his jurisdiction." See Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 87 S. Ct. 1213 (1967). Compare to Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970 (1984) (judge can be sued for declaratory and injunctive relief) (equitable relief). Without money damages in federal court you cannot get a jury trial. Without a jury trial in front of your fellow citizens the odds are you will not have your grievances against a judge adjudicated fairly. Men are more often bribed by their loyalties and ambitions than by money. United States v. Wunderlich, 72 S. Ct. 154, 157 (1951) (Justice Jackson, dissenting). Some States do allow jury trial in equitable relief situations. Missouri is one example. Notice that the statutes are worded so that only an attorney will understand them. Section 527.090 means "jury trial," even though other statutes must be read to understand it. Missouri Revised Statutes,  527.090. When a proceeding under sections 527.010 to 527.130 involves the determination of an issue of fact, such issue may be tried and determined in the same manner as issues of fact are tried and determined in other civil actions in the court in which the proceeding is pending. "Other civil actions" are covered by the Missouri Constitution: Article I, BILL OF RIGHTS, Section 22(a) That the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate; provided that a jury for the trial of criminal and civil cases in courts not of record may consist of less than twelve citizens as may be prescribed by law, and a two-thirds majority of such number concurring may render a verdict in all civil cases; that in all civil cases in courts of record, three-fourths of the members of the jury concurring may render a verdict; and that in every criminal case any defendant may, with the assent of the court, waive a jury trial and submit the trial of such case to the court, whose finding shall have the force and effect of a verdict of a jury. Missouri Revised Statutes,  527.010. The circuit courts of this state, within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree. Missouri Revised Statutes,  527.020. Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. All we need at the federal level is the proposed Bill of Rights Restoration Act with the trial to be presided over by a judge who is not a member of the "courts of inferior jurisdiction" already established by Congress under Article III, Section 1, U. S. Constitution. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. I.e., who will "judge the judges"? The common people on a jury. Our forefathers knew that people in position of power tend to abuse that power. Today legislative enactments and judicial opinions are often enacted and rendered with the idea that those in power will "do the right thing." It doesn't happen. Power corrupts. Under God's Law power and privilege are not allowed to corrupt the court system: Ye shall not doe unjustly in judgment; Thou shalt not favour the person of the poore, nor honour the person of the mightie: but thou shalt judge thy neighbor justly. Leviticus 19:15, The 1599 Geneva Bible Under man's law the results of a caste-system legal system have often been disastrous, from the English defeat at Hastings in 1066 to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. A legal system in which one set of rules applies to the rich and politically connected and another set of rules applies to the rest of the people soon leaves the majority of the population without any legal rights or remedies whatsoever. Citizens mistreated by their government's legal system soon come to despise the government itself. A passage from The Peasant's Revolt 1381, page 106, by Lindsay and Groves bears repeating: Lawyers were the most hated of all, these men who cheated justice, who had crept into the manorial courts and stolen the last shreds of liberty from the serfs. The insurgents in the 1381 uprising were well-disciplined for the most part. Their leaders even hanged their own for looting. But the insurgents were simply uncontrollable when it came to judges and lawyers: they killed every one they could get their hands on. James Madison, the "father of the Constitution," had a few things to say that bear repeating today: [A] [Constitutional] right implies a remedy. The Federalist No. 43. Pennsylvania in 1783 and 1784 had a Council of Censors, 'to inquire whether the [State] Constitution had been preserved inviolate in every part.' The Federalist No. 48. [T]he people . . . can alone declare its [the Constitution's] true meaning, and enforce its observance. The Federalist No. 49. CONCLUSION It is not the habit of the corrupt to cure themselves. We want our country back. We need your help. Please help us gather the signatures to petition the Congress to enact this statute. For a sample petition please write to us or simply photocopy the proposed statute and mail it to your Congressman along with your request for his help in enacting it. Mike Brown P. O. Box 4884 Springfield, Mo. 65808 To write or call your Congressmen: Representative's Name Senator's Name U. S. House of Representatives United States Senate Washington, D. C. 20515 Washington, D. C. 20510 (202) 225-3121 (202) 224-3121 Call the switchboard numbers above if you need to determine who your Representative and Senators are.APPENDIX You may think Congress is unresponsive. On an individual basis, that is quite often correct. However, there is a world of difference between one letter to one Congressman on one subject and several million letters to all of the members of Congress on the same subject. In the latter case Congress, much more often than you might think, enacts the legislation requested. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.  2000bb, enacted to overcome a Supreme Court decision (Congress, not the Supreme Court, is the supreme authority on the Constitution), is a prime example. It may not seem that one person sending a petition, even if it has only a single signature on it, can do much. However, if that one person can talk two more people into doing the same thing and those two in turn convince two more (4) in geometric progression, we can put several million letters and petitions into Congress. Other Things You Can Do 1. Register to vote. Most juries are comprised of people selected from registered voter lists. When called, help us take our country back: one court case at a time. 2. Elect a United States Senator who understands what the problem is and who caused it. A single United States Senator can pur a "hold" on a presidential appointment. See Smith, THE POWER GAME, HOW WASHINGTON WORKS, page 68 (1988). All federal judges are presidential appointments. 3. Acquire and distribute extra copies of this publication to like-minded people. 1 As in "Supreme Court precedent" that we have today. 2 Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant which is escaped from his master unto thee. Deuteronomy 23:15. 3 Clio: The muse of history. 4 Sir Edward Coke (Spelling in the sixteenth century was not consistent, even in the same document.) 5 Abrogate: To annul, cancel , revoke, repeal or destroy. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, page 8. 6 Solicitor-General: A law officer (in England ranking next to the Attorney-General), who takes the part of the state or crown in suits affecting the public interest. 7 "Bel," Microsoftr Encartar 96 Encyclopedia. c 1993-1995 Microsoft Corporation. 8 Andrew Hamilton, Esquire, defended John Peter Zenger in the 1735 trial for criminal libel. Hamilton was called "the day star of the American Revolution" by Governor Morris. 9 You might think this procedure violates the Fourth Amendment. It does not, according to the judges themselves. If medical tests and exams are not part of a criminal investigation, even though the subject does not want them, the Fourth Amendment is not violated. See Yin v. State of Cal., 95 F. 3d 864 (9th Cir. 1996). 1 Solecism: A nonstandard usage or grammatical construction; a violation of etiquette; an impropriety, a mistake, or an incongruity. If you would like to learn more about our legal system, both how to use it without a lawyer and how to correct it, listen to Michael H. Brown on his show SOLUTIONS on satellite: G.E. 1, 103 Degrees, Transponder 7 Audio 5.8 Wideband, Horizontal Polarity Monday thru Friday 7-8 eastern time 6-7 central time 5-6 mountain time LIVE CALL IN: 1-800-607-8255 American Freedom Network http://www.amerifree.com Books by Michael H. Brown available: Brown's Lawsuit Cookbook: How to Sue And Win $25.00 The Erwin Rommel School of Law: How To Defeat An Illegal Legal System $100.00 To order by mail, send check or money order to: American Freedom Network P.O. Box 430 Johnstown, Co. 80534 To order with MasterCard or Visa call toll free: 1-800-205-6245 For extra copies of this booklet send $5.00 to: Michael H. Brown P.O. Box 4884 Springfield, Mo. 65808 Ten (10) or more copies $2.50 each. For quantities of 500 or more please inquire. Also available is the 1599 GENEVA BIBLE for $129.00. It comes with a hard cover, 8" X 10", and weighs over 6 pounds. The translators and authors of the thousands of marginal notes in the Geneva Bible believed that God's Law, both Old and New Testaments are still in effect and to be obeyed. See Matthew 5:17-19. The thousands of marginal notes were authored by John Calvin, John Knox, and other leaders of the Reformation. These notes are not available anywhere else. The thousands of marginal notes illuminated many confusing passages. For example, read Zephaniah 3:3 (judges as evening wolves who gnaw not the bone till the morrow). Learn about the religion of our ancestors. Compare the thousands of marginal notes with the commentaries of today and you will readily see the difference. For example, "Libya" in 1599, referred to in Ezekial 38:5, meant all of Africa. As other examples, the Reformers understood the "sun, the moon, and the stars" bowing down to Joseph meant his father, mother, and brothers and "stars falling from the heavens," meant the religious leaders of the latter days would be discredited. The 1599 edition contains the words and sheet music to 150 songs sung in the Reformation Churches of that era. These are just a few examples of the benefits of the marginal notes found within the Geneva Bible. The Geneva Bible with these marginal notes can be a useful study aid in your search for the truth.