George Bush: The Unauthorized Biography--- by Webster G. Tarpley & Anton Chaitkin
Chapter -XVIII- Iran- Contra
``What pleases the prince has the force of law.''
``As long as the police carries out the will of the leadership, it is acting
-- Gestapo officer Werner Best@s1
We cannot provide here a complete overview of the Iran-Contra affair. We shall attempt, rather, to give an account of George Bush's decisive, central role in those events, which occurred during his vice-presidency and spilled over into his presidency. The principal elements of scandal in Iran-Contra may be reduced to the following points:
2) the Reagan-Bush administration's secret arming of its `` Contras '' for war against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, while such aid was explicitly prohibited under U.S. law;
3) the use of communist and terrorist enemies--often armed directly by the Anglo-Americans--to justify a police state and covert, oligarchical rule at home;
4) paying for and protecting the gun-running projects with drug- smuggling, embezzlement, theft by diversion from authorized U.S. programs, and the `` silencing '' of both opponents and knowledgeable participants in the schemes; and
5) the continual, routine perjury and deception of the public by government officials pretending to have no knowledge of these activities; and the routine acquiescence in that deception by Congressmen too frightened to oppose it.
When the scandal broke, in late 1986 and early 1987, George Bush maintained that he
knew nothing about these illegal activities; that other government officials involved in
them had kept him in the dark; that he had attended no important meetings where these
subjects were under discussion. Since that time, many once- classified documents have come
to light, which suggest that Bush organized and supervised many, or most, of the criminal
aspects of the Iran-Contra adventures. The most significant events relevant to George
Bush's role are presented here in the format of a chronology. At the end of the
chronology, parts of the testimony of George Bush's loyal assistant Donald Gregg will be
provided, to allow for a comparison of the documented events with the Bush camp's account
of things. Over the time period covered, the reader will observe the emergence of new
structures in the U.S. government:
Donald Gregg brought along into the Vice President's office his old relationship with mid-level CIA assassinations manager Felix I. Rodriguez. Gregg had been Rodriguez's boss in Vietnam. Donald Gregg worked under Bush in Washington from 1976--when Bush was CIA Director--through the later 1970s, when the Bush clique was at war with President Carter and his CIA Director, Stansfield Turner. Gregg was detailed to work at the National Security Council between 1979 and 1982. From 1976 right up through that NSC assignment, CIA officer Gregg saw CIA agent Rodriguez regularly. Both men were intensely loyal to Bush.@s3 Their continuing collaboration was crucial to Vice President Bush's organization of covert action. Rodriguez was now to operate out of the Vice President's office.
``To accomplish these objectives Charlie [United States Information Agency Director Charles Z. Wick] has had two lengthy meetings with a group of people representing the private sector. This group had included principally program directors rather than funders. The group was largely pulled together by Frank Barnett, Dan McMichael (Dick [Richard Mellon] Scaife's man), Mike Joyce (Olin Foundation), Les Lenkowsky (Smith Richardson Foundation) plus Leonard Sussman and Leo Cherne of Freedom House. A number of others including Roy Godson have also participated. '' [Everything above in parentheses is in the original].@s6
Elsewhere, Raymond described Cherne and Godson as the coordinators of this group. Frank Barnett was the director of the Bush family's National Strategy Information Center, for which Godson was the Washington, D.C. director. Barnett had been the project director of the Smith Richardson Foundation prior to being assigned to that post. The Smith Richardson Foundation has sunk millions of dollars into the Iran-Contra projects. Some Smith Richardson grantees, receiving money since the establishment of the National Security Council's ``private steering committee'' (according to the foundation's annual reports) include the following:
Rodriguez followed his CIA boss Ted Shackley to Southeast Asia in 1970. Shackley and Donald Gregg put Rodriguez into the huge assassination and dope business which Shackley and his colleagues ran during the Indochina war; this bunch became the heart of the ``Enterprise'' that went into action 15 to 20 years later in Iran- Contra. Shackley funded opium-growing Meo tribesmen in murder, and used the dope proceeds in turn to fund his hit squads. He formed the Military Assistance Group-Special Operations Group (MAG-SOG) political murder unit; Gen. John K. Singlaub was a commander of MAG- SOG; Oliver North and Richard Secord were officers of the unit. By 1971, the Shackley group had killed about 100,000 civilians in Southeast Asia as part of the CIA's Operation Phoenix. After Vietnam, Felix Rodriguez went back to Latin American CIA operations, while other parts of the Shackley organization went on to drug- selling and gun-running in the Middle East. By 1983, both the Mideast Shackley group and the self-styled ``Shadow Warrior,'' Felix Rodriguez, were attached to the shadow commander-in-chief, George Bush.
Menges continued: ``... A factual update was the first order of business. Then the discussion moved to the availability of military forces and how long it would take to ready them. The objective, right from the beginning, was to plan a rescue [of American students detained on Grenada] that would guarantee quick success, but with a minimum of casualties....'' ``The first suggested presidential decision was to prepare for possible military action by shifting navy ships, which were taking a marine unit to rotate forces in Lebanon, plus other naval units, toward Grenada. ``Secrecy was imperative.... As part of this plan, there would be no change in the schedule of the top man. President Reagan ... would travel to Augusta, Georgia, for a golf weekend. Secretary of State Shultz would go too....'' Work now proceeded on detailed action plans, under the guidance of the Vice President's Special Situation Group. ``Late Friday afternoon [Oct. 21] ... the CPPG ... [met] in room 208.... Now the tone of our discussions had shifted from whether we would act to how this could be accomplished.... ''[The] most secure means [were to] be used to order U.S. ships to change course ... toward Grenada. Nevertheless, ABC news had learned about this and was broadcasting it.''
Thus, the course of action decided upon without the President was ``leaked'' to the news media, and became a fait-accompli. Menges's memo continues:
Clearly, there was no perceived need to follow the U.S. Constitution and leave the question of whether to make war up to the Congress. After all, President Reagan had concurred, from the golf course, with Acting President Bush's decision in the matter. And the British nominee in the target country had requested Mr. Bush's help!
The reader may have already surmised that Vice President Bush (with his background in `` oilfield service '' and his control of a `` top-level committee of the National Security Council '') sat in his Washington office and planned these brilliant schemes. But such a guess is probably incorrect--it is off by about 800 miles. On Jupiter Island, Florida, where the Bush family has had a seasonal residence for the past several decades (see Chapter 4) is the headquarters of Continental Shelf Associates, Inc. (CSA).@s1@s4
This company describes itself as `` an environmental consulting firm specializing in applied marine science and technology ... founded in 1970.... The main office ... is located in Jupiter, Florida, approximately 75 miles north of Miami. '' CSA has `` Offshore and Onshore divisions. '' It lists among its clients Exxon Company, U.S.A.; Military Sealift Command; Pennzoil Company; U.S. Department of Defense/Army Corps of Engineers; and other oil companies and government agencies. CSA's main advertised concern is with underwater engineering, often involving oil or nuclear facilities. It has many `` classified '' projects. It employs the world's most sophisticated subsurface vehicles and monitoring equipment. The founder and chief executive of CSA is Robert `` Stretch '' Stevens. A former lieutenant commander in naval special operations, Stevens has been a close associate of CIA officer Theodore Shackley, and of Bush agent Felix Rodriguez since the early 1960s, when Stevens served as a boat captain in the invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, and through the Vietnam War. During the period 1982-85, CSA was contracted by the U.S. intelligence community, including the CIA, to carry out coastal and on-the-ground reconnaissance and logistical support work in the eastern Mediterranean in support of the U.S. Marine deployment into Lebanon; and coastal mapping and reconnaissance of the Caribbean island of Grenada prior to the October 1983 U.S. military action. Beginning in approximately the autumn of 1983, CSA was employed to design and execute a program for the mining of several Nicaraguan harbors. After the U.S. Senate restricted such activities to non-U.S. personnel only, CSA trained `` Latin American nationals '' at a facility located on El Bravo Island off the eastern coast of Nicaragua. Acta Non Verba (Deeds Not Words) is a `` subsidiary '' of CSA, incorporated in 1986 and located at the identical Jupiter address. Rudy Enders, the head of the CIA's paramilitary section--and deployed by George Bush aide Donald Gregg--is a minority owner of Acta Non Verba (ANV). ANV's own tough-talking promotional literature says that it concentrates on `` counter-terrorist activities in the maritime environment. '' A very high-level retired CIA officer, whose private interview was used in preparation for this book, described this `` Fish Farm '' in the following more realistic terms: `` Assassination operations and training company controlled by Ted Shackley, under the cover of a private corporation with a regular board of directors, stockholders, etc., located in Florida. They covertly bring in Haitian and Southeast Asian boat people as recruits, as well as Koreans, Cubans, and Americans. They hire out assassinations and intelligence services to governments, corporations, and individuals, and also use them for covering or implementing `Fish Farm' projects/activities. '' The upshot of the attack from Jupiter--the mining of Nicaragua's harbors--was that the Congress got angry enough to pass the `` Boland II '' amendment, re-tightening the laws against this public- private warfare (see entry for Oct. 3, 1984).
On Nov. 10, 1983, a year before the arrest, Felix Rodriguez had filed the annual registration with Florida's secretary of state on behalf of Latchinian's and Rodriguez's joint enterprise, `` Giro Aviation Corp. ''@s1@s8
Milian Rodriguez was interviewed in his prison cell in Butner, North Carolina, by investigative journalist Martha Honey. He said Felix Rodriguez had offered that `` in exchange for money for the Contra cause he would use his influence in high places to get the [Cocaine] cartel U.S. `good will'.... Frankly, one of the selling points was that he could talk directly to Bush. The issue of good will wasn't something that was going to go through 27 bureaucratic hands. It was something that was directly between him and Bush. '' Ramon Milian Rodriguez was a Republican contributor, who had partied by invitation at the 1981 Reagan-Bush inauguration ceremonies. He had been arrested aboard a Panama-bound private jet by federal agents in May 1983, while carrying over $5 million in cash. According to Felix Rodriguez, Milian was seeking a way out of the narcotics charges when he met with Felix on January 18, 1985. This meeting remained secret until two years later, when Felix Rodriguez had become notorious in the Iran-Contra scandal. The Miami Herald broke the story on June 30, 1987. Felix Rodriguez at first denied ever meeting with Ramon Milian Rodriguez. But then a new story was worked out with various agencies. Felix `` remembered '' the Jan. 18, 1985 meeting, claimed he had `` said nothing '' during it, and `` remembered '' that he had filed documents with the FBI and CIA telling them about the meeting just afterwards.@s2@s0
Felix's ghost writer doesn't tell us what was said, only that Felix was `` able to show [Bush] some of the photos from my album. The honor of being with the Vice President ... was overwhelming. Mr. Bush was easy to talk to, and he was interested in my stories. ''@s2@s1
Over the next two years, Rodriguez met frequently with Bush staff members in Washington and in Central America, often jointly with CIA and other officials, and conferred with Bush's staff by telephone countless times.@s2@s6
On Friday, Rodriguez supervised delivery in Honduras of military supplies for the FDN Contras whose main base was there in Honduras.
On Saturday, George Bush met with Honduran President Roberto Suazo Cordova. Bush told
Suazo that the Reagan-Bush administration was expediting delivery of more than $110
million in economic and military aid to Suazo's government. This was the `` quid pro quo
'': a bribe for Suazo's support for the U.S. mercenary force, and a transfer through
Honduras of the Contra military supplies, which had been directly prohibited by the
This was the first known official contact of the Israeli Nir with the U.S. government in the Iran-Contra affair. In the future, Nir would serve as the main Israeli agent in the covert arms-for- hostages negotiations with Iran, alongside such other well-known U.S. participants as Oliver North and Robert McFarlane. The Terrorism Task Force organization, as we shall see, was a permanent affair.@s2@s7
The officials discussed shipment of U.S.-made arms to Iran through Israel--to replenish Israeli stocks of TOW missiles and to permit Israel to sell arms to Iran.
According to testimony by Robert McFarlane, the transfer was supported by George Bush, Casey and Donald Regan, and opposed by Shultz and Weinberger.@s2@s8
Elsewhere in the diary pages for that day, Colonel North noted that DelAmico had procured a certain 1,000 munitions items for the Contras.@s3@s0
Bush's CPPG later organized the U.S. bombing of Libya, which occurred in mid-April 1986.
Loudly and publicly exposed in the midst of Iran arms deals, Veillot was indicted by the U.S. Then the charges were quietly dropped, and Veillot went underground. A few months later Hashemi died suddenly of `` leukemia. ''@s3@s6
At this meeting, Nir proposed specifically that prisoners held by Israeli-controlled Lebanese, and 3,000 American TOW missiles, be exchanged for U.S. hostages held by Iran. Other discussions between Nir and Bush's nominee involved the supposedly new idea that the Iranians be overcharged for the weapons shipped to them, and the surplus funds be diverted to the Contras.@s3@s7
Secretary of State George Shultz later told the Tower Commission that George Bush supported the arms-for-hostages deal at this meeting, as did President Reagan, Casey, Meese, Regan and Poindexter. Shultz reported that he himself and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger both opposed further arms shipments.@s3@s9
Later, at North's trial, the Bush administration--portraying Colonel North as the master strategist in the case!--stipulated that North `` prepared talking points for a meeting between Admiral Poindexter, Vice-President Bush, and [the new] Honduran President [Jose Simon] Azcona. North recommended that Admiral Poindexter and Vice-President Bush tell President Azcona of the need for Honduras to work with the U.S. government on increasing regional involvement with and support for the Resistance. Poindexter and Bush were also to raise the subject of better U.S. government support for the states bordering Nicaragua. '' That is, Honduras, which of course `` borders on Nicaragua, '' was to get more U.S. aid and was to pass some of it through to the Contras. In preparation for the January 1986 Bush-Azcona meeting, the U.S. State Department sent to Bush adviser Donald Gregg a memorandum, which `` alerted Gregg that Azcona would insist on receiving clear economic and social benefits from its [Honduras's] cooperation with the United States. ''@s4@s2 Two months after the January Bush-Azcona meeting, President Reagan asked Congress for $20 million in emergency aid to Honduras, needed to repel a cross-border raid by Nicaraguan forces against Contra camps. Congress voted the `` emergency '' expenditure.
The unofficial Bush report, the official Bush report released in February, and the Bush-organized NSDD 207, together put forward Oliver North as `` Mr. Iran-Contra. '' North became the nominal, up- front coordinator of the administration's counterterrorism program, hiding as best he could Bush's hand in these matters. He was given a secret office and staff (the Office to Combat Terrorism), separate from regular NSC staff members. George Bush now reassigned his Terrorism Task Force employees, Craig Coy and Robert Earl, to do the daily work of the North secret office. The Bush men spent the next year working on Iran arms sales: Earl devoted one-quarter to one- half of his time on Iran and Contra support operations; Coy ``knew everything'' about Project Democracy. North traveled much of the time. Earl and Coy were at this time officially attached to the Crisis Management Center, which North worked on in 1983.@s4@s6 FBI Assistant Director Revell, often George Bush's ``hit man'' against Bush's domestic opponents, partially disclosed this shell game in a letter to Sen. David Boren (D-Ok.), explaining the FBI's contacts with North:
The Bush Terrorism Task Force, having completed its official work, had simply made itself into a renamed, permanent, covert agency. Its new name was Operations Sub-Group (OSG). In this transformation, CIA Contra-handler Duane Clarridge had been added to the Task Force to form the ``OSG,'' which included North, Poindexter, Charles Allen, Robert Oakley, Noel Koch, General Moellering and ``Buck'' Revell. According to the Oliver North diaries, even before this final phase of the Bush-North apparatus there were at least 14 meetings between North and the Bush Task Force's senior members Holloway, Oakley and Allen, its principal consultant Terry Arnold, and its staff men Robert Earl and Craig Coy. The North diaries from July 1985 through January 1986, show one meeting with President Reagan, and four meetings with Vice President Bush: either the two alone, North with Bush and Amiram Nir, or North with Bush and Donald Gregg. The Bush counterterrorism apparatus had its own communications channels, and a global antiterrorist computer network called Flashboard outside of all constitutional government arrangements. Those opposed to the arming of terrorists, including cabinet members, had no access to these communications.@s4@s8 This apparatus had responsibility for Iran arms sales; the private funding of the Contras, from contributions, theft, dope-running; the ``public diplomacy'' of Project Democracy to back these efforts; and counterintelligence against other government agencies and against domestic opponents of the policy.@s4@s9
Brenneke later said publicly that early in 1986, he called Menarczik to warn that he had learned that the U.S. planned to buy weapons for the Contras with money from Iran arms sales. Menarczik reportedly said, `` We will look into it. '' Menarczik claimed not to have `` any specific recollection of telephone conversations with '' Brenneke.@s5@s4
Tolliver says that another of the flights he performed for
Rodriguez carried cocaine on the return trip to the U.S.A. He made a series of arms
deliveries from Miami into the air base at Agucate, Honduras. He was paid in cash by
Rodriguez and his old Miami CIA colleague, Rafael `` Chi Chi '' Quintero. In another
circuit of flights, Tolliver and his crew flew between Miami and El Salvador's Ilopango
air base. Tolliver said that Rodriguez and Quintero `` instructed me where to go and who
to see. '' While making these flights, he `` could go by any route available without any
interference from any agency. We didn't need a stamp of approval from Customs or
anybody.... ''@s5@s7 With reference to the covert arms shipments out of Miami, George
Bush's son Jeb said: `` Sure, there's a pretty good chance that arms were shipped, but
does that break any law? I'm not sure it's illegal. The Neutrality Act is a completely
untested notion, established in the 1800s. ''@s5@s8
Trafficking in lethal weapons without government authorization is always a tricky business for covert operators. But when the operatives are smuggling weapons in a particular traffic which the U.S. Congress has expressly prohibited, a good deal of criminal expertise and certain crucial contacts are required for success. And when the smugglers report to the Vice President, who wishes his role to remain concealed, the whole thing can become very sticky--or even ludicrous to the point of low comedy.
Shortly before that April 20 meeting, Rafael Quintero had asked me to impose upon my good
relations with the Salvadoran military to obtain `end-user' certificates made out to Lake
Resources, which he told me was a Chilean company.... ''@s6@s0
The plan was to acquire false end-user certificates from his contacts in the Salvadoran armed forces for Blowpipe ground-to-air missiles supposedly being shipped into El Salvador. The missiles would then be illegally diverted to the Contras in Honduras and Nicaragua. Rodriguez continues, with self-puffery: `` The Salvadorans complied with my request, and in turn I supplied the certificates, handing them over personally to Richard Secord at that April 20 meeting. ''@s6@s1 While arranging the forgery for the munitions sale, Rodriguez was in touch with the George Bush staff back in his home office. On April 16, four days before the Rodriguez-North missile meeting, Bush national security adviser Donald Gregg asked his staff to put a meeting with Rodriguez on George Bush's calendar. Gregg said the purpose of the White House meeting would be `` to brief the Vice President on the war in El Salvador and resupply of the Contras. '' The meeting was arranged for 11:30 A.M. on May 1.@s6@s2 Due its explicitly stated purpose-- clandestine weapons trafficking in an undeclared war against the rigid congressional prohibition--the planned meeting was to become one of the most notorious of the Iran-Contra scandal.
The following reminder message was sent to George Bush:
At this meeting it was decided that `` private citizen '' Felix Rodriguez would continue his work in Central America.@s6@s4
The participants decided to seek support for the Contras from nations (`` third countries '') which were not directly involved in the Central American conflict. As a result of this initiative, George Bush's former business partners, the Sultan of Brunei, donated $10 million to the Contras. But after being deposited in secret Swiss bank accounts, the money was `` lost. ''@s6@s5
Craig Fuller's memorandum said, in part:
2. The VP's 25 minute meeting was arranged after Mr. Nir called Craig Fuller and requested the meeting and after it was discussed with the VP by Fuller and North....
14. Nir described some of the lessons learned: `We are dealing with the most radical elements.... They can deliver ... that's for sure.... [W]e've learned they can deliver and the moderates can't....@s6@s9
The Scandal Breaks--On George Bush
Felix Rodriguez called George Bush's aide Sam Watson again. Watson now notified the White House Situation Room and the National Security Council staff about the missing aircraft.
Oliver North was immediately dispatched to El Salvador to prevent publicity over the event, and to arrange death benefits for the crew.@s7@s4
After the shoot-down, several elaborate attempts were made by government agencies to provide false explanations for the origin of the aircraft.
A later press account, appearing on May 15, 1989, after Bush was safely installed as President, exposed one such attempted coverup:
WASHINGTON-- Nicaraguan rebels falsely assumed responsibility for an arms-laden plane downed over Nicaragua in 1986 in an effort to shield then-Vice President George Bush from the controversy that soon blossomed into the Iran-Contra scandal, a senior Contra official said in early May 1989. According to the Contra official, who requested anonymity but has direct knowledge of the events, a Contra spokesman, Bosco Matamoros [official FDN representative in Washington, D.C.], was ordered by [FDN Political Director] Adolfo Calero to claim ownership of the downed aircraft, even though the plane belonged to Oliver North's secret Contra supply network.... Calero called (Matamoros) and said, `` Take responsibility for the Hasenfus plane because we need to take the heat off the vice president, '' the Contra source said.... The senior Contra official said that shortly after Calero talked to Matamoros, Matamoros called a reporter for the New York Times and `` leaked '' the bogus claim of responsibility. The Times ran a story about the claim on its front page.@s7@s5
George Bush's career was now on the line. News media throughout the world broke the story of the Hasenfus capture, and of the crewman's fingering of Bush and his underlings Rodriguez and Posada Carriles. Bush was now besieged by inquiries from around the world, as to how and why he was directing the gun-running into Latin America. Speaking in Charleston, South Carolina, George Bush described Max Gomez/Rodriguez as `` a patriot. '' The Vice President denied that he himself was directing the illegal operations to supply the Contras: `` To say I'm running the operation ... it's absolutely untrue. '' Bush said of Rodriguez: `` I know what he was doing in El Salvador, and I strongly support it, as does the president of El Salvador, Mr. Napoleon Duarte, and as does the chief of the armed forces in El Salvador, because this man, an expert in counterinsurgency, was down there helping them put down a communist- led revolution [i.e. in El Salvador, not Nicaragua]. ''@s7@s7
Two days later, Gen. Adolfo Blando@aan, armed forces chief of staff in El Salvador, denied Bush's contention that Felix Rodriguez worked for his country's military forces: `` This intrigues me. It would have to be authorized [by our] joint chiefs of staff [and] the government. '' He said such authorization had not been given.@s7@s8
George Bush, when President, rewarded Dick Cheney by appointing him U.S. Secretary of Defense, after the Senate refused to confirm John Tower.
The Mortification of the U.S. Congress
Gregg was now famous in Washington as Bush's day-to-day controller of the criminal gun-running into Central America. Before the Gregg hearings began, both Republican and Democratic Senators on the committee tried to get President Bush to withdraw the Gregg nomination. This was to save them the embarrassment of confirming Gregg, knowing they were too intimidated to stop him.
What follows are excerpts from the typed transcript of the Gregg hearings. The transcript has never been reproduced, it has not been printed, and it will not be published by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which is evidently embarrassed by its contents.@s8@s8
Sen. Sarbanes: And Felix would come to see you there?
Gregg: No, at my home.... [Then] he brought me in '83 the plan which I have already discussed with Senator Cranston.... [At that point] I was working for the Vice President ... [which I began in] August 1982.
Sen. Sarbanes: In December of 1984 he came to see you with the idea of going to El Salvador. You ... cleared it with the Vice President?
Gregg: ... I just said, `` My friend Felix, who was a remarkable former agency employee ... wants to go down and help with El Salvador. And I am going to introduce him to [State Department personnel] and see if he can sell himself to those men, '' and the Vice President said fine.
Gregg: Felix went down there about the first of March . Before he went ... I introduced him to the Vice President ... and the Vice President was struck by his character and wished him well in El Salvador.
Sen. Sarbanes: So before he went down, you undertook to introduce him to the Vice President.... Why did you do that?
Gregg: Well, the Vice President had always spoken very highly and enthusiastically of his career [!], or his one-year as DCI [Director of Central Intelligence]. I had gone out with him to the agency just after I joined him in '82 and I saw the tremendous response he got there and he got quite choked up about it and as we drove back in the car he said, you know, that is the best job I have ever had before I became Vice President. So here it was, as I said probably the most extraordinary CIA comrade I had known, who was going down to help in a country that I knew that the Vice President was interested in.... The Vice President was interested in the progress of the Contras. There were two occasions on which he asked me, how are they doing and I, on one occasion went to a CIA officer who was knowledgeable and got a run-down on how they were doing from that and sent it to the Vice President and he sent it back with no comment. On another occasion, he asked me again, how are they doing, and I went--I drew a memo up, I think on the basis of a conversation with North. Again, he returned that with no comment. So he was interested in the Contras as an instrument of putting pressure on the Sandinistas. But what I said we had never discussed was the intricacies, or who was supplying what to whom....
Sen. Simon: Let me read another section from Senator Cranston's statement. I believe the record suggests the following happened: After Boland II was signed in October 1984 [outlawing all U.S. aid to the Contras], you and certain others in the White House were encouraged to secure military aid for the Contras through unorthodox channels. Your career training in establishing secrecy and deniability for covert operations, your decades-old friendship for Felix Rodriguez, apparently led you to believe you could serve the national interest by sponsoring a freelance covert operation out of the Vice President's office. What is your response to that statement?
Gregg: Well, I think it is a rather full-blown conspiracy theory. That was not what I was doing.... I was involved in helping the Vice President's task force on antiterrorist measures write their report. But normally I had no operational responsibilities....
Sen. Simon: When did you first find out the law was being violated?
Gregg: By the law, do you mean the Boland amendment?
Sen. Simon: That is correct.
Gregg: I guess my knowledge of that sort of came at me piecemeal after Hasenfus had been shot down [Oct. 5, 1986] and there were various revelations that came out....
Sen. Simon: So what you are telling us, you found out about the law being violated the same time the rest of us found out the law was being violated?
Gregg: Yes, sir....
Sen. Cranston: From February 1985 to August 1986, you have acknowledged that you spoke to Rodriguez many, many times on the telephone. Let me quote from your sworn deposition to the Iran- Contra Committee: `` Felix called me quite often and frequently it was what I would call sort of combat catharsis. He used to do the same thing in Vietnam. He would come back from an operation in which some people had been lost and he would tell me about it. '' Now, is it still your testimony that Rodriguez never mentioned his deep involvement in Contra supply activities during any of these phone conversations?
Gregg: That is my testimony.
Sen. Cranston: Is it still your testimony that prior to Aug. 8th, 1986, Rodriguez never mentioned the status of his Contra resupply efforts during his numerous face-to-face meetings with you in Washington?
Sen. Cranston: Is it still your testimony that Rodriguez did not mention the status of his Contra resupply efforts in the very meetings that were convened according to two memos bearing your name, for Rodriguez to `` brief the Vice President on the status of the war in El Salvador and efforts to resupply the Contras ''?
Gregg: There was no intention to discuss resupply of the Contras and everyone at that meeting, including former Senator Nick Brady have testified that it was not discussed.
Sen. Cranston: As you know, it is difficult to reconcile those statements about what happened in the meeting with the statement and memos from you that the agenda was ... two things, one of them being efforts to resupply the Contras....
Gregg: Those memos first surfaced to my attention in December of 1986, when we undertook our first document search of the Vice President's office. They hit me rather hard because by that time I had put the pieces together of what had been going on and I realized the implications of that agenda item. I did not shred the documents. I did not hide it.... [T]his is the worst thing I have found and here it is, and I cannot really explain it.... I have a speculative explanation which I would like to put forward if you would be interested.
Sen. Cranston: Fine.
Gregg: Again, turning to Felix [Rodriguez]'s book ... Felix makes the following quote.... [By the way the book] is going to be published in October of this year. The text has been cleared by CIA and it is now with the publishers. I was given an advance copy.... This is the quote, sir: `` ... I had no qualms about calling [Sam Watson] or Don [Gregg] when I thought they could help run interference with the Pentagon to speed up deliveries of spare chopper parts. '' That means helicopters. `` I must have made many such calls during the spring of 1986. Without operating Hughes 500 helicopters it was impossible to carry out my strategy against the [El Salvadoran] insurgents.... '' [There are] then documented steps that Colonel Watson had taken with the Pentagon to try to get spare parts expedited for El Salvador.... So my construction is this, sir. I recall that in the meeting with the Vice President the question of spare parts for the helicopters in El Salvador was discussed and so that I think what the agenda item on the two memos is, is a garbled reference to something like resupply of the copters, instead of resupply of the Contras [emphasis added]. [At this point there was laughter and whistling in the hearing room. Afterwards, Gregg told reporters, `` I don't know how it went over, but it was the best I could do. '']
Sen. Sarbanes: How did the scheduling proposal of April 16, 1986 and the briefing memorandum of April 30th take place?
Gregg: They were prepared by my assistant, Mrs. Byrne, acting on advice from Colonel Watson. She signed my initials, but those are not my initials. I did not see the documents until December 1986, when I called them to the attention of the House Intelligence Committee.... And if, you know, if you do not--if my speculation does not hold up, I have to refer you to a memorandum that I turned over to the Iran-Contra Committee on the 14th of May 1987, which--
Sen. Sarbanes: I am looking at that memorandum now.
Gregg: Okay. That has been my explanation up until now.
Sen. Sarbanes: But you are now providing a different explanation?
Gregg: It is the only one--I have been thinking about these documents for over two years, and it is the only thing that I can come up with that would come close to explaining that agenda item--given the fact that there was no intention of discussing resupply to the Contras. That resupply of the Contras was not discussed, according to the testimony of everyone who was in the meeting....''
Sen. Kerry: Douglas Minarczik is who?
Gregg: He was one of my assistants in my office responsible for Mid-East and African affairs....
Sen. Kerry: And he was working for you in 1985 and 1986, that period?
Sen. Kerry: Now, when I began first investigating allegations of the gun-running that was taking place out of Miami, one of the very first references that my staff, frankly, frequently heard, and I think you and I have talked about this, that Miami was buzzing with the notion that the Vice President's office was somehow involved in monitoring that, at least [emphasis added]. Now, Jesus Garcia was a Miami corrections official who got into trouble and wound up going to jail on weapons offenses. Through that connection, we came across telephone records. And those telephone records demonstrate calls from Garcia's house to Contra camps in Honduras, to John Hull in Costa Rica, and Douglas Minarczik in, not necessarily in your office, but directly to the White House. However, there is incontrovertible evidence that he had in his possession the name of Mr. Minarczik, a piece of paper in our possession, in Garcia's home in connection with monitoring those paramilitary operations, in August of 1985. Now, how do you account for the fact that Minarczik's--that the people involved with the Contra supply operations out of Miami ... had Minarczik's name and telephone number, and that there is a record of calls to the White House at that time?
Gregg: I cannot account for it. Could it have anything to do with our old friend Mr. Brenicke [sic]? Because Brenicke did have Minarczik's phone number....
Sen. Kerry: ... No. Totally separate.
Gregg: This is all new. I do not have an explanation, sir....
Sen. Kerry: Do you recall the downing of a Cuban airliner in  in which 72 people lost their lives as a result; do you remember that?
Sen. Kerry: A terrorist bomb. And a Cuban-American named Luis Posada [Carriles] was arrested in Venezuela in connection with that. He then escaped in 1985 with assistance from Felix Rodriguez-- I do not know if this is going to be in the [Rodriguez] book or not...
-Gregg: It is.
Sen. Kerry: Okay, and he brought him to Central America to help the Contras under pseudonym of Ramon Medina, correct? Gregg: Now, I know that; yes.
Sen. Kerry: ... [Is] it appropriate for a Felix Rodriguez to help a man indicted in a terrorist bombing to escape from prison, and then appropriate for him to take him to become involved in supply operations, which we are supporting?
Gregg: I cannot justify that, sir. And I am not certain what role Felix played in getting him out.... I thought that Orlando Boche [sic], or someone of that nature, had been responsible for that.
Sen. Kerry: When did you first learn that [i.e. about Posada's hiring for Contra resupply], Don?
Gregg: When I learned who the various aliases were, which was some time in November/December , after the whole thing came out.
COMMITTEE SESSION JUNE 15, 1989
Mr. Gregg remains steadfast in his loyalty to his boss, then-Vice President Bush, and to his long-time friend, Felix Rodriguez. Mr. Gregg has served his country in the foreign policy field for more than three decades. By all accounts he is a loyal American.... As Mr. Gregg himself conceded last month, there are substantial reasons for senators to suspect his version of events and to raise questions about his judgement. It does not take a suspicious or partisan mind to look at the documentary evidence, the back channel cables, the `` eyes only '' memos, and then to conclude that Mr. Gregg has not been straight with us. Indeed, I am informed that more than one Republican senator who has looked at the accumulated weight of the evidence against Mr. Gregg, has remained unconvinced and has sought Mr. Gregg's withdrawal.
Mr. Gregg, this committee has a fundamental dilemma. If we are to promote a man we believe to have misled us under oath, we would make a mockery of this institution. We would invite contempt for our enquiries. We would encourage frustration of our constitutional obligations. ... [It] has been established that when you are confronted with written evidence undermining your story, you point the finger of blame elsewhere. At our last hearing you said Gorman's cables were wrong, North's notebooks were wrong, Steele's memory was wrong, North's sworn testimony [that Gregg introduced Rodriguez to him] was wrong, you concocted a theory that your aide, Watson, and your secretary erred by writing `` Contras '' instead of `` helicopters '' on those infamous briefing memos for the Vice President. In sum, you have told a tale of an elaborate plan in which your professional colleagues and long-time friends conspired to keep you ignorant of crucial facts through days of meetings, monthly phone calls and nearly two years' worth of cables and memos. Incredibly, when senators confront you with the documentary evidence which undermines your story, you accuse us of concocting conspiracy theories and you do so with a straight face. ... I think it is clear by now that many important questions may never be answered satisfactorily, especially because we have been stonewalled by the administration. The National Security Agency has rejected our legitimate enquiries out of hand. The Central Intelligence Agency provided a response with access restrictions so severe ... as to be laughable. The Department of Defense has given an unsatisfactory response two days late. The State Department's response was utterly unresponsive. They answered our letter after their self-imposed deadline and failed to produce specific documents we requested and which we know exist. This Committee has been stonewalled by Oliver North, too. He has not complied with the Committee subpoena for his unredacted notebooks. The redacted notebooks contain repeated January 1985 references to Felix Rodriguez which suggests North's involvement in Rodriguez' briefings of the Vice President. No member of the Senate can escape the conclusion that these administration actions are contemptuous of this Committee. I find this highly regrettable, with potential long-term ramifications, but I recognize the will of the majority to come to a committee vote soon, up or down, and to move on to other pressing business [emphasis added]....
Sen. McConnell: ... During the period of the Boland Amendment, were you ever asked to inform the Vice President's office or lend his name to private, nonprofit efforts to support the Contras?
Gregg: Yes. I recall one instance, in particular, where there was a request--I guess it was probably from one aspect of the Spitz Channell organization, which had a variety of things going on in and around Nicaragua. We got, on December 2nd, 1985, a letter to the Vice President, asking him to get involved in something called the Friends of the Americas, which was aid to the Meskito Indians ... in Nicaragua that had been badly mistreated by the Sandinistas.... And so I have a document here which shows how we dealt with it. I sent it to Boyden Gray, the counsel of the Vice President and said, `` Boyden, this looks okay as a charity issue, but there is the question of precedent. Please give me a legal opinion. Thanks. '' ... Boyden Gray wrote back to me and said, `` No, should not do. Raises questions about indirect circumvention of congressional funding limits or restriction, vis-a- vis Nicaragua. '' That is the only time I recall that we had a specific request like that, and this is how we dealt with it. [In fact, George Bush had a much more interesting relationship to the affairs of Carl R. `` Spitz '' Channell than Mr. Gregg discusses here. Channell worked with Bush's covert action apparatus, moving his wealthy contacts toward what he termed `` the total embrace of the Vice President. '']
Sen. Pell [Chairman of the Committee]: ... First, you say that you offered to resign twice, I think. Knowing that you are a very loyal servant of what you view as the national interest, and knowing the embarrassment that this nomination has caused the administration, I was wondering why you did not ask your name to be withdrawn ... to pull your name back.... [w]hich has been recommended by many of us as being a way to resolve this problem.
Gregg: Well, I haven't because I think I'm fully qualified to be Ambassador to South Korea. And so does the Vice President [sic]. So I am here because he has asked me to serve....
Sen. Cranston: ... Senators will recall that on Oct. 5th of '86 a plane bearing military supplies to the Contras was shot down over Nicaragua. The sole survivor, Eugene Hasenfus, spoke publicly of the role of Felix Rodriguez, alias Max Gomez, in aiding military resupply and noted Gomez's ties to the Vice President's office. Could you please describe your understanding of why it was that the first call to official Washington regarding the shootdown was from Felix Rodriguez to your aid[e] in Washington?
Gregg: ... [It] was because on the 25th of June of that year he had come to Washington to confront North about what he regarded as corruption in the supply process of the Contras.... [H]e broke with North on the 25th of June and has not been on speaking terms with the man since then.... [H]e tried to get me--he could not--he reached Colonel Watson....
Sen. Cranston: As you recall, the Vice President was besieged at that time with inquiries regarding Rodriguez's ties to the Vice President's office. What did you tell [Bush press spokesman] Marlin Fitzwater regarding that relationship?
Gregg: ... The thrust of the press inquiries was always that from the outset I had had in mind that Rodriguez should play some role in the Contra support operation, and my comments to Marlin ... were that that had not been in my mind....
Sen. Cranston: Let me quote again from the New York Times, George Bush quoted October 13, '86. Bush said, `` To the best of my knowledge, this man, Felix Rodriguez, is not working for the United States government. '' Now Mr. Gregg, you knew that Rodriguez was aiding the Contras and receiving material assistance in the form of cars, housing, communications equipment and transportation from the U.S. government. Did you inform Bush of those facts so that he could make calculated misleading statements in ignorance of his staff's activities?
Gregg: ... At that point I had no idea that Felix--you said--you mentioned communications equipment. I had no idea he had been given by North one of those encryption devices. I think I was aware that Colonel Steele had given him access to a car, and I knew he was living in a BOQ at the air base. He was not being paid any salary. His main source of income was, as it is now, his retirement pension from CIA.
Sen. Cranston: ... You told the Iran-Contra committee that you and Bush never discussed the Contras, had no expertise on the issue, no responsibility for it, and the details of Watergate-sized scandal involving NSC staff and the [Edwin] Wilson gang was not Vice Presidential. Your testimony on that point I think is demonstrably false. There are at least six memos from Don Gregg to George Bush regarding detailed Contra issues....
Sen Cranston: Am I correct in this, that you have confirmed ... that senior U.S. military, diplomatic ... and intelligence personnel, really looked with great doubt upon Rodriguez's mission and that they tolerated it only because Rodriguez used his contacts with the Vice President and his staff as part of the way to bolster his mission.
Gregg: ... I was not aware of the diplomatic; I was aware of the military and intelligence, yes, sir.
The committee voted in favor of confirmation. Cranston voted no. But three Democrats--Charles Robb, Terry Sanford and Chairman Claiborne Pell--joined the Republicans. Sanford confirmed Cranston's viewpoint, saying that he was allowing the nomination to go through because he was afraid `` the path would lead to Bush, '' the new President. Sanford said, shamefacedly, `` If Gregg was lying, he was lying to protect the President, which is different from lying to protect himself. ''[Emphasis added]@s8@s9
In George Bush's government, the one-party state, the knives soon came out, and the prizes appeared. The Senate Ethics Committee, including the shamefaced Terry Sanford, began in November 1989, its attack on the `` Keating Five. '' These were U.S. Senators, among them Senator Alan Cranston, charged with savings and loan corruption. The attack soon narrowed down to one target only--the Iran-Contrary Senator Cranston. On Aug. 2, 1991, Senator Terry Sanford, having forgotten his shame, took over as the new chairman of the Senate Ethics Committee.
Bush, LaRouche and Iran- Contra
George Bush and his friends have repeatedly told political pundits that America is `` tired '' and `` bored '' of hearing about the Iran-Contra affair. Bush has taken a dim view of those who were not tired or bored, but fought him.
Oct. 6, 1986 was a fateful day in Washington. The secret government apparatus learned that the Hasenfus plane had been shot down the day before, and went scurrying about to protect its exposed parts. At the same time, it sent about 400 heavily armed FBI agents, other federal, state and local policemen storming into the Leesburg, Virginia, publishing offices associated with the American dissident political leader Lyndon LaRouche, Jr. LaRouche and his political movement had certified their danger to the Bush program. Six months before the raid, LaRouche associates Mark Fairchild and Janice Hart had gained the Democratic nominations for Illinois lieutenant governor and secretary of state; they won the primary elections after denouncing the government-mafia joint coordination of the narcotics trade. With this notoriety, LaRouche was certain to act in an even more unpredictable and dangerous fashion as a presidential candidate in 1988. LaRouche allies were at work throughout Latin America, promoting resistance to the Anglo-Americans. The LaRouche-founded Executive Intelligence Review had exposed U.S. government covert support for Khomeini's Iranians, beginning in 1980. More directly, the LaRouchites were fighting the Bush apparatus for its money.
Connecticut widow Barbara Newington, who had given Spitz Channell's National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty $1,735,578 out of its total 1985 income of $3,360,990,@s9@s0 was also contributing substantial sums to LaRouche-related publishing efforts ... which were exposing the Contras and their dope-pushing. Fundraiser Michael Billington argued with Mrs. Newington, warning her not to give money to the Bush- North-Spitz Channell gang.
Back on August 19, 1982, and on November 25, 1982, George Bush's old boss, Henry A. Kissinger, had written to FBI Director William Webster, asking for FBI action against `` the LaRouche group. '' In promoting covert action against LaRouche, Kissinger also got help from James Jesus Angleton, who had retired as chief of counterintelligence for the CIA. After Yalie Angleton got going in this anti-dissident work, he mused `` Fancy that, now I've become Kissinger's Rebbe. ''@s9@s1
One week before the raid, an FBI secret memorandum described the LaRouche political movement as `` subversive, '' and claimed that its `` policy positions ... dovetail nicely with Soviet propaganda and disinformation objectives. ''@s9@s2
Three months after Spitz Channell's fraud confession, Vice President Bush denounced LaRouche at an Iowa campaign rally: `` I don't like the things LaRouche does.... He's bilked people out of lots of money, and misrepresented what causes money was going to. LaRouche is in a lot of trouble, and deserves to be in a lot of trouble. ''@s9@s3
LaRouche and several associates eventually went on trial in Boston, on a variety of `` fraud '' charges--neither `` subversion '' nor defunding the Contras was in the indictments. Bush was now running hard for the presidency. Suddenly, in the midst of the primary elections, the LaRouche trial took a threatening turn. On March 10, 1988, Federal Judge Robert E. Keeton ordered a search of the indexes to Vice President George Bush's confidential files to determine whether his spies had infiltrated LaRouche-affiliated organizations. Iran-Contra Special Prosecutor Lawrence Walsh had acquired, and turned over to the LaRouche defense, in response to an FOIA request, a secret memorandum found in Oliver North's safe. It was a message from Gen. Richard Secord to North, written May 5, 1986--four days after North had met with George Bush and Felix Rodriguez to confirm that Rodriguez would continue running guns to the Contras using Spitz Channell's payments to Richard Secord. The memo, released in the Boston courtroom, said, `` Lewis has met with FBI and other agency reps and is apparently meeting again today. Our Man here claims Lewis has collected info against LaRouche. ''@s9@s4
The government conceded that `` our man here '' in the memo was Bush Terrorism Task Force member Oliver `` Buck '' Revell, the assistant director of the FBI. `` Lewis ''--`` soldier of fortune '' Fred Lewis--together with Bush operatives Gary Howard and Ron Tucker, had met later in May 1986, with C. Boyden Gray, counsel to Vice President Bush.@s9@s5 Howard and Tucker, deputy sheriffs from Bush- family-controlled Midland, Texas, were couriers and bagmen for money transfers between the National Security Council and private `` counterterror '' companies. They were also professional sting artists.
Howard and Tucker had sold 100 battle tanks to a British arms dealer for shipment to Iran, and had taken his $1.6 million. Then they turned him in to British authorities and claimed a huge reward. A British jury, outraged at Howard and Tucker, threw out the criminal case in late 1983. The LaRouche defense contended, with the North memo and other declassified documents, that the Bush apparatus had sent spies and provocateurs into the LaRouche political movement in an attempt to wreck it. Judge Keeton demanded that the Justice Department tell him why information they withheld from the defense was now appearing in court in declassified documents.
The government was not forthcoming, and in May 1988, the judge declared a mistrial. The jury told the newspapers they would have voted for acquittal. But Bush could not afford to quit. LaRouche and his associates were simply indicted again, on new charges. This time they were brought to trial before a judge who could be counted on. Judge Albert V. Bryan, Jr. was the organizer, lawyer and banker of the world's largest private weapons dealer, Interarms of Alexandria, Virginia. As the new LaRouche trial began, the CIA-front firm that the judge had founded controlled 90 percent of the world's official private weapons traffic. Judge Bryan had personally arranged the financing of more than a million weapons traded by Interarms between the CIA, Britain and Latin America. Agency for International Development trucks carried small arms, rifles, machine guns and ammunition from Interarms in Alexandria for flights to Cuba--first for Castro's revolutionary forces. Then, Judge Bryan's company, Interarms, provided guns for the anti-Castro initiatives of the CIA Miami Station, for Rodriguez, Shackley, Posada Carriles, Howard Hunt, Frank Sturgis, et al. When George Bush was CIA Director, Albert V. Bryan's company was the leading private supplier of weapons to the CIA.@s9@s6
In the LaRouche trial, Judge Bryan prohibited virtually all defense initiatives. The jury foreman, Buster Horton, had top secret clearance for government work with Oliver North and Oliver `` Buck '' Revell. LaRouche and his associates were declared guilty.
On January 27, 1989--one week after George Bush became President--Judge Albert V. Bryan sentenced the 66-year dissident leader LaRouche to 15 years in prison. Michael Billington, who had tried to wreck the illicit funding for the Contras, was jailed for three years with LaRouche; he was later railroaded into a Virginia court and sentenced to another 77 years in prison for `` fundraising fraud. ''
Return to the Table of Contents
1. William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 271.
2. Memo, May 14, 1982, two pp. bearing the nos. 29464 and 29465. See also `` NSDD-2 Structure for Central America, '' bearing the no. 29446, a chart showing the SSG and its CPPG as a guidance agency for the National Security Council. Photostats of these documents are reproduced in the EIR Special Report: `` Irangate, the Secret Government and the LaRouche Case, '' (Wiesbaden, Germany: Executive Intelligence Review Nachrichtenagentur, June 1989), p. 19.
3. Testimony of Donald P. Gregg, pp. 72-73 in Stenographic Transcript of Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination Hearing for Donald Phinney Gregg to be Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. Washington, D.C., May 12, 1989 (hereinafter identified as `` Gregg Hearings ''). This transcript is available for reading at the office of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in the Capitol, Washington, D.C. See also Felix Rodriguez and John Weisman, Shadow Warrior (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), pp. 213-14. The book was ghost written--and spook-approved--by the CIA and Donald Gregg before publication.
4. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran Contra Affair (hereinafter identified as the `` Iran-Contra Report ''), published jointly by the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, and the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, Nov. 17, 1987, Washington, D.C., pp. 395-97. Note that different sections of the Congressional Iran-Contra Report were published on different dates.
5. CovertAction, No. 33, Winter 1990, p. 12; drawn from Public Testimony of Fawn Hall, Iran-Contra Report, June 8, 1987, p. 15.
6. Memoranda and meetings of March 1983, in the `` National Security Archive '' Iran-Contra Collection on microfiche at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Reading Room (hereinafter identified as `` Iran-Contra Collection '').
7. Don Gregg Memorandum for Bud McFarlane, March 17, 1983, stamped SECRET, since declassified. Document no. 77 in the Iran- Contra Collection; on the memo is a handwritten note from `` Bud '' [McFarlane] to `` Ollie '' [North]. See also Gregg Hearings, pp. 54- 55.
8. Rodriguez and Weisman, op. cit., p. 119.
9. Shultz Memorandum, May 25, 1983 and White House reply, both stamped SECRET/SENSITIVE. Documents beginning no. 00107 in the Iran- Contra Collection.
10. De Graffenreid Memorandum for Admiral Murphy, July 12, 1983, since declassified, bearing the no. 43673. Document no. 00137 in the Iran-Contra Collection.
11. Constantine C. Menges, Inside the National Security Council (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), pp. 70-78.
12. Chronology supplied by the Office of the Vice President, cited in The Progressive, May 18, 1987, London, England, p. 20.
13. Rodriguez and Weisman, op. cit., p. 221.; CovertAction, No. 33, Winter 1990, p. 13, citing Testimony of Oliver North; Iran-Contra Report (June 8, 1987), pp. 643, 732-33.
14. This section is based on 1) literature supplied by CSA, Inc. and its subsidiary ANV, and 2) an exhaustive examination of CSA/ANV in Jupiter and other locations, including interviews with personnel employed by the company, and with military and CIA personnel who have worked with the company.
15. Scott Armstrong, Executive Editor for The National Security Archive, The Chronology: The Documented Day-by-Day Account of the Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Contras (New York: Warner Books, 1987), p. 55. Jonathan Marshall, Peter Dale Scott and Jane Hunter, The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era (Boston: South End Press, 1987), pp. 219- 20.
16. National Security Planning Group Meeting Minutes, June 25, 1984, pp. 1 and 14, photostats reproduced in EIR Special Report: `` American Leviathan: Administrative Fascism under the Bush Regime '' (Wiesbaden, Germany: Executive Intelligence Review Nachrichtenagentur, April 1990), p. 159.
17. This is an excerpt from Section 8066 of Public Law 98-473, the Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1985; Iran-Contra Report, Nov. 13, 1987, p. 398l.
18. Armstrong, op. cit., Nov. 1, 1984 entry, p. 70, citing Miami Herald 11/2/84 and 11/3/84, Wall Street Journal 11/2/84, Washington Post 8/15/85, New York Times 12/23/87. Armstrong, op. cit., Nov. 10, 1983 entry, p. 42, citing corporate records of the Florida secretary of state 7/14/86, Miami Herald 11/2/84, New York Times 11/3/84.
19. Rodriguez and Weisman, op. cit., pp. 220-21; EIR Special Report: `` American Leviathan, '' pp. 157-58.
20. Report of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, December 1988, pp. 61-62.
21. Rodriguez and Weisman, op. cit., pp. 221-22.
22. Ibid., pp. 224- 25.
23. General Gorman `` eyes only '' cable to Pickering and Steele, Feb. 14, 1985. Partially declassified and released on July 30, 1987 by the National Security Council, bearing no. D 23179. Document no. 00833 in the Iran-Contra Collection. See also Rodriguez and Weisman, op. cit., pp. 225-26.
24. U.S. government stipulations in the trial of Oliver North, reproduced in EIR Special Report: `` Irangate..., '' pp. 20, 22.
25. Gregg Hearings, p. 99.
26. Rodriguez and Weisman, op. cit., p. 227. Gregg Hearings, New York Times, Dec. 13, 1986.
27. CovertAction, No. 33, Winter 1990, pp. 13-14. On Amiram Nir, see Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 225-26, citing Wall Street Journal 12/22/86, New York Times 1/12/87. On Poindexter and North, see Menges,op. cit., p. 264.
28. Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 140-41, citing Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, `` Report on Preliminary Inquiry, '' Jan. 29, 1987.
29. Rodriguez and Weisman, op. cit., pp. 239-41.
30. Oliver North's diary, since edited and partially declassified, entries for `` 10 Sep 85. '' Document no. 01527 in the Iran-Contra Collection.
31. Washington Post, June 10, 1990.
32. Charles E. Allen `` Memorandum for the Record, '' December 18, 1985. Partially declassified/released (i.e. some parts are still deleted) by the National Security Council on January 26, 1988. Document no. 02014 in the Iran-Contra Collection.
33. Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 226-27, citing Wall Street Journal 12/22/86, New York Times 12/25/86 and 1/12/87.
34. Armstrong, op. cit., p. 231, citing Washington Post 2/20/87, New York Times 2/22/87.
35. Ibid., p. 232, citing Miami Herald 11/30/86. 36. Interview with Herman Moll in EIR Special Report: `` Irangate..., '' pp. 81-83.
37. Armstrong, op. cit., p. 235, citing Washington Post 12/16/86, 12/27/86, 1/10/87 and 1/12/87; Ibid., p. 238, citing Tower Commission Report; Menges, op. cit., p. 271.
38. Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 240-41, citing Washington Post 1/10/87 and 1/15/87; Sen. John Tower, Chairman, The Tower Commission Report: The Full Text of the President's Special Review Board (New York: Bantam Books, 1987), p. 217.
39. Ibid., pp. 37, 225.
40. North notebook entry Jan. 9, 1986, Exhibits attached to Gregg Deposition in Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey v. John Hull, Rene Corbo, Felipe Vidal et al., 29 April 1988.
41. Armstrong, op. cit., p. 258, citing the Brenneke letter, which was made available to the National Security Archive.
42. U.S. government stipulations at the North trial, in EIR Special Report: `` Irangate..., '' p. 22.
43. Tower Commission Report, pp. 67-68, 78.
44. Armstrong, op. cit., p. 266, citing Washington Post 1/10/87 and 1/15/87.
45. Chronology supplied by Office of Vice President Bush; Armstrong, op. cit., p. 266, citing Washington Post 12/16/86.
46. Deposition of Robert Earl, Iran-Contra Report, May 2, 1987, Vol. 9, pp. 22-23; Deposition of Craig Coy, Iran-Contra Report, March 17, 1987, Vol. 7, pp. 24-25: cited in CovertAction, No. 33, Winter 1990, p. 13.
47. Oliver Revell to Sen. David Boren, chairman of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, April 17, 1987; Washington Post Feb. 17, 20 and 22, 1987; Wall Street Journal Feb. 20, 1987: cited in CovertAction, No. 33, Winter 1990, p. 13.
48. Newsweek, Oct. 21, 1985, p. 26; Earl Exhibit, nos. 3- 8, attached to Earl Deposition, op. cit. cited in CovertAction No. 33, Winter 1990, p. 15.
49. Earl Deposition, op. cit., May 30, 1987, pp. 33-37; May 15, 1987, pp. 117-21 (Channell and Miller); May 15, 1987, pp. 131, 119 (private contributors).
50. Donald Gregg Briefing Memorandum for the Vice President, Jan. 27, 1986; released by the National Security Council March 22, 1988. Document no. 02254 in Iran-Contra Collection.
51. Armstrong, op. cit., p. 275, citing Miami Herald 11/30/86.
52. Ibid., p. 280, citing the Menarczik letter to Brenneke which was made available to the National Security Archive.
53. Ibid., citing Miami Herald 11/30/86.
54. New York Times, Nov. 30, 1986, Dec. 4, 1986. See Gregg testimony: Brenneke had M's number.
55. Quoted in Menges, op. cit., p. 275.
56. Deposition of Michael Tolliver in Avirgan and Honey, op. cit.
57. Allan Nairn, `` The Bush Connection, '' in The Progressive (London: May 18, 1987), pp. 21-22.
58. Nairn, op. cit., pp. 19, 21-23.
59. Tower Commission Report, p. 465
60. Rodriguez and Weisman, op. cit., pp. 244-45.
62. `` Schedule Proposal, '' Office of the Vice President, April 16, 1986, exhibit attached to Gregg Deposition in Avirgan and Honey, op. cit.
63. Office of the Vice President Memorandum, April 30, 1986, released Aug. 28, 1987 by the National Security Council. Document no. 02738 in the Iran-Contra Collection.
64. Rodriguez and Weisman, op. cit., pp. 245-46. See also Gregg confirmation hearings, excerpted infra, and numerous other sources.
65. Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 368-69, citing Senate Select Intelligence Committee Report, Jan. 29, 1987. 66. Ibid., p. 373, citing Washington Post 12/16/86.
67. Ibid., p. 388-89, citing McFarlane testimony to the Tower Commission.
68. Affidavit of Eugene Harry Hasenfus, October 12, 1986, pp. 2- 3. Document no. 03575 in the Iran-Contra Collection. 69. Tower Commission Report, pp. 385-88.
70. Washington Post, Feb. 26, 1987.
71. Hasenfus Affidavit, pp. 6-7. 72. Ibid.
73. Hasenfus Affidavit, p. 7.
74. Armstrong, op. cit., p. 508, citing the chronology provided by George Bush's office, Washington Post 12/16/86; New York Times 12/16/86, 12/17/86 and 12/25/86; Wall Street Journal 12/19/86 and 12/24/86.
75. Laredo [Texas] Morning Times, May 15, 1989, p. 1.
76. Washington Post, Oct. 11, 1986.
77. Washington Post, Oct. 12, 1986, Oct. 14, 1986.
78. Washington Post, Oct. 14, 1986.
79. Hasenfus Affidavit, p. 3.
80. Rodriguez and Weisman, op. cit., p. 241.
81. Washington Post, Nov. 20, 1986.
82. Washington Post, Feb. 12, 1987.
83. Washington Post, Dec. 18, 1986, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 19, 1986.
84. Donald T. Regan, For the Record: From Wall Street to Washington (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch, 1988), pp. 368-73.
86. New York Times, March 2, 1989.
87. CovertAction, No. 33, Winter 1990, p. 15.
88. Stenographic Transcript of Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination Hearing for Donald Phinney Gregg to be Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. Washington, D.C., May 12 and June 15, 1989. Some misspellings in the transcript have been corrected here.
89. Mary McCrory, `` The Truth According to Gregg, '' Washington Post, June 22, 1989.
90. NEPL contributions 1985 printout, cited in Armstrong, op. cit., p. 226.
91. Kissinger letters, declassified in 1984, photostats in EIR Special Report: `` Irangate..., '' pp. 52, 55. Angleton quote in Tom Mangold, Cold Warrior (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), p. 352. Mangold defines `` rebbe '' as `` not a rabbi, but trusted counselor and family friend. '' See also Burton Hersh, `` In the Hall of Mirrors: The Cold War's Distorted Images, '' in The Nation, June 23, 1991. Hersh says: `` I knew Angleton in the last five years of his life [he died May 11, 1987]. Angleton was amusing himself just then with a vendetta against Lyndon LaRouche. ''
92. Director FBI to D[efense] I[ntelligence] A[gency], Sept. 30, 1986, classified SECRET.
93. Bush at Shelton, Iowa, July 31, 1987, quoted in EIR Special Report: `` Irangate..., '' p. 65.
94. Secord to North 5/5/86 memorandum marked SECRET, declassified Feb. 26, 1988 by Special Prosecutor Lawrence Walsh, photostat in EIR Special Report: `` Irangate..., '' p. 31.
95. Washington Post, March 27, 1989.
96. Corporate records of the First National Bank of Alexandria and the First Citizens Bank of Alexandria, 1940s to 1960s, in Polk's Bankers Directory. Clarence J. Robinson, Reminiscences (Fairfax, Va.: George Mason University, 1983). Robinson was the owner of the massive weapons warehouse, `` Robinson's Terminal Warehouse, '' for which Albert V. Bryan was the registered agent. Over 100 interviews with family, friends and associates of Judge Bryan in banking, freemasonry, armaments, Episcopal Church and other fields.
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